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BETTER SETTLE THAN SORRY: THE
REGRET AVERSION THEORY OF
LITIGATION BEHAVIOR
Chris Guthrie*
Legal scholars have developed two dominant theories of liti-
gation behavior: the Economic Theory of Suit and Settlement,
which is based on expected utility theory, and the Framing Theory
of Litigation, which is based on prospect theory. While Professor
Guthrie acknowledges the explanatory power of these theories, he
argues that they are flawed because they portray litigants solely as
calculating creatures. These theories disregard any role emotion
might play in litigation decision making.
Guthrie proposes a complementary theory-the Regret Aver-
sion Theory of Litigation Behavior-that views litigants as both
calculating and emotional creatures. With roots in economics, cog-
nitive psychology, and social psychology, the Regret Aversion The-
ory predicts that individuals will seek to make decisions that
minimize the likelihood they will experience postdecision regret.
Because regret is most likely to arise when individuals discover that
they would have obtained better outcomes if they had decided dif-
ferently, the Regret Aversion Theory predicts that people will make
decisions that shield them from this knowledge.
Using an experimental survey methodology, Guthrie tests this
theory in the litigation context and finds that litigants, when choos-
ing between settlement and trial, systematically prefer settlement
because it minimizes the likelihood that they will experience regret.
Settling reduces regret by allowing litigants to avoid discovering
that trial might have been the better decision; trial offers no such
protection. Guthrie concludes by examining the implications of the
Regret Aversion Theory for lawyers and for the legal system as a
whole.
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INTRODUCTION
Approaching trial was one thing; going to court after turning down a
multimillion dollar offer was another.... In court everything is black
and white-you argue your case, give it all you've got, and if you lose
... the judge and jury were against you from the start. But failing to
reach a settlement once negotiations began left only yourself to blame
and carried the legal and moral weight of having rejecting a suboptimal
deal for possibly none at all.'
Litigants and their lawyers make numerous decisions throughout
the litigation process, including whether to file a complaint, how to
respond, what sorts of pretrial motions to file, what discovery to un-
dertake, and ultimately, whether to settle or go to trial. Recognizing
the ubiquitous decision making that characterizes the litigation pro-
cess,' legal scholars have proposed two dominant theories of litigation
behavior,3 both of which are based on decision theories developed in
other disciplines.4
Law and economics scholars, drawing upon expected utility the-
ory, have proposed an Economic Theory of Suit and Settlement.5 The
Economic Theory posits that litigants are economically rational actors
who make risk-averse6 or risk-neutral7 choices designed to maximize
outcomes.
1. BARRY WERTH, DAMAGES: ONE FAMILY'S LEGAL STRUGGLES IN THE WORLD OF
MEDICINE 327 (1998) (emphasis added) (chronicling one family's medical malpractice action on
behalf of their infant son, Tony, who was born with profound birth defects).
2. Decision making is ubiquitous not only in litigation but in life generally. See, e.g., Mark
C. Suchman, On Beyond Interest: Rational, Normative and Cognitive Perspectives in the Social
Scientific Study of Law, 1997 Wis. L. REV. 475, 475 ("Perhaps the most basic aspect of human
behavior is 'decision-making'-the process of selecting between alternative, incompatible lines
of action. We make hundreds of such selections each day, both as individuals and as members of
collectivities.").
3. Two other theoretical efforts to model the litigation process include Mnookin & Korn-
hauser's strategic bargaining theory, see Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in
the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979), and the game-theoretic or
asymmetric information models of litigation proposed by Bebchuk, P'ng, and others. See, e.g.,
Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Litigation and Settlement Under Imperfect Information, 15 RAND J.
ECON. 404 (1984); Barry Nalebuff, Credible Pretrial Negotiation, 18 RAND J. ECON. 198 (1987); I.
P. L. P'ng, Strategic Behavior in Suit, Settlement, and Trial, 14 BELL J. ECON. 539 (1983); Jennifer
F. Reinganum & Louis L. Wilde, Settlement, Litigation, and the Allocation of Legal Costs, 17
RAND J. ECON. 557 (1986).
4. "Legal scholars derive most of their positive theory from models developed outside the
law. Even the normative theories owe much, and not infrequently everything, to these extralegal
models. Hence, we legal academics have a rational interest in cutting-edge ideas developed by
professors of philosophy, cognitive psychology, political science, economics, and so forth." Wil-
liam N. Eskridge, Jr., Rationality and Cognition, 3 LEGAL THEORY 101, 101 (1997).
5. See infra Part I.A.
6. In economic terms, "[a] risk averter is defined as one who, starting from a position of
certainty, is unwilling to take a bet which is actuarially fair." KENNETH J. ARROW, ESSAYS IN
THE THEORY OF RISK-BEARING 90 (1971); see also Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices,
Values, and Frames, 39 AM. PSYCHOL. 341, 341 (1984) [hereinafter Kahneman & Tversky,
Choices] (noting that "a preference for a sure outcome over a gamble that has higher or equal
expectation is called risk averse"); Richard P. Larrick, Motivational Factors in Decision Theories:
The Role of Self-Protection, 113 PSYCHOL. BULL. 440, 440 (1993) [hereinafter Larrick, Motiva-
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Law and psychology scholars,8 drawing upon cognitive psychol-
ogy's prospect theory,9 have proposed a Framing Theory of Litigation.
The Framing Theory posits that litigants are more sensitive to relative
gains and losses than they are to absolute outcomes. As a result, liti-
gants are inclined to make risk-averse choices when selecting between
gains and risk-seeking' ° choices when selecting between losses.
While these theories explain much litigation behavior, they are
ultimately inadequate because they rest on an impoverished view of
the human beings actually making litigation decisions. Both the Eco-
nomic and Framing Theories treat litigants solely as calculating crea-
tures. They allow no role for actual or anticipated emotion in the
litigation decision-making process, even though "[m]any decisions,"
including litigation decisions, "can be understood in terms of a desire
to avoid the unpleasant psychological consequences that result from a
decision that turns out poorly."11
The primary purpose of this article is to propose and test a theory
of litigation behavior that recognizes litigants not only as calculating
creatures, but also as feeling creatures. The proposed Regret Aversion
Theory of Litigation Behavior contends that litigants base at least
tional Factors] (observing that risk-averse decision makers "prefer certain outcomes to risky
courses of action that have the same or higher expected value"); Paul J. H. Schoemaker, The
Expected Utility Model: Its Variants, Purposes, Evidence and Limitations, 20 J. ECON. LiTERA-
TURE 529, 532 (1982) ("If some gamble is less.., preferred than its expected monetary value for
sure, the preference is said to be risk-averse.").
7. A risk-neutral decision maker is indifferent between options with identical expected
values. See, e.g., A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 53 (2d
ed. 1989).
8. The leading proponent of the Framing Theory is Jeff Rachlinski. See Jeffrey J. Rachlin-
ski, Gains, Losses, and the Psychology of Litigation, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 113 (1996); see also
Linda Babcock et al., Forming Beliefs About Adjudicated Outcomes: Perceptions of Risk and
Reservation Values, 15 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 289 (1995); Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie,
Psychological Barriers to Litigation Settlement: An Experimental Approach, 93 MICH. L. REV.
107 (1994) [hereinafter Korobkin & Guthrie, Psychological Barriers].
9. Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman formulated "prospect theory" in a series of arti-
cles beginning with Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA
263, 268-69 (1979) [hereinafter Kahneman & Tversky, Prospect Theory]. See also Kahneman &
Tversky, Choices, supra note 6, at 342-44; Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Rational Choice
and the Framing of Decisions, 59 J. Bus. S251, S257-60 (1986) [hereinafter Tversky &
Kahneman, Rational Choice]; Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions
and the Psychology of Choice, 211 SCIENCE 453, 453-55 (1981) [hereinafter Tversky &
Kahneman, Framing]. For more recent work on prospect theory, see Amos Tversky & Daniel
Kahneman, Advances in Prospect Theory: Cumulative Representation of Uncertainty, 5 J. RISK &
UNCERTAINTY 297 (1992) [hereinafter Tversky & Kahneman, Cumulative Representation]; Amos
Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice: A Reference-Dependent Model,
106 Q.J. ECON. 1039 (1991). For more information about the Framing Theory, see infra Part I.B.
10. A risk-seeker's preference is the opposite of the risk-averter's preference. See, e.g.,
Kahneman & Tversky, Choices, supra note 6, at 341 ("[T]he rejection of a sure thing in favor of
a gamble of lower or equal expectation is called risk seeking"); Larrick, Motivational Factors,
supra note 6, at 441 ("The tendency to favor a gamble that has the same or lower expected value
than a certain outcome is known in the decision-making literature as risk seekingness or risk
proneness."); Schoemaker, supra note 6, at 532 ("If some gamble is .. .more [ ] preferred than
its expected monetary value for sure, the preference is said to be ... risk-seeking [].").
11. Larrick, Motivational Factors, supra note 6, at 440.
No. 11
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some litigation decisions on "a desire to avoid the unpleasant psycho-
logical consequences" of regret arising from "a decision that turns out
poorly."'1 2 This theory, meant to complement rather than compete
with the existing theories, seeks to enhance our understanding of liti-
gation behavior. By explaining the role that expected value compari-
sons (the Economic Theory) and the framing of decision options (the
Framing Theory) play in litigation decision making, the existing theo-
ries have taken us a long way toward understanding litigation behav-
ior. The proposed Regret Aversion Theory, which acknowledges the
incontrovertible fact that litigants are emotional as well as calculating
creatures, begins to round out our understanding of litigation.
I proceed below as follows. In part I, I thoroughly explain the
existing theories of litigation behavior, the Economic Theory and the
Framing Theory, and the decision theories upon which they are based,
expected utility theory and prospect theory. I then argue that these
theories fail to adequately explain litigation decision making because
they are premised on an inadequate account of the human beings
making litigation decisions. In part II, I propose my complementary
Regret Aversion Theory of Litigation Behavior. In part III, I test the
Regret Aversion Theory through hypothetical lawsuit scenarios ad-
ministered to first-year law students. Using this experimental method-
ology, I show that both plaintiffs and defendants factor anticipated
regret into their decision making and systematically prefer settlement
to trial as a consequence. In part IV, I explore some of the challenges
regret aversion poses to lawyers representing clients in the civil litiga-
tion system. Finally, I conclude by observing that our civil justice sys-
tem uses regret aversion, wittingly or unwittingly, to create an
emotional or psychological incentive for litigants to settle.
I. THE LITIGATION THEORIES
The two prevailing theories of litigation behavior-the Economic
Theory of Suit and Settlement and the Framing Theory of Litigation-
make different predictions about the behavior of litigants because
they rest on different theories of decision making. In this part of the
article I introduce each litigation theory and explain the theory of de-
cision making upon which each is based. After explaining the theories,
I then argue that they need supplementation because their view of the
human beings making litigation decisions is too limited to capture the
complexity of litigation behavior.
12. Id.
[Vol. 1999
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A. The Economic Theory of Suit and Settlement
The Economic Theory of Suit and Settlement-promulgated by
such prominent law and economics scholars as Robert Cooter,13 John
Gould,14 Benjamin Klein, 5 William Landes, 6 Richard Posner, 7
George Priest, 8 Daniel Rubinfeld, 19 and Steven Shavell 2°-posits that
economically rational"' litigants make risk-neutral22 or risk-averse 3
choices to maximize outcomes.24 When deciding whether to settle a
case or go to trial, the Economic Theory predicts that litigants com-
pare the value of settlement to the expected value of trial and select
whichever of the options promises more value. 5 Because the costs of
13. See generally Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Economic Analysis of Legal
Disputes and Their Resolution, 27 J. ECON. LrTERATURE 1067 (1989) (reviewing the law and
economics literature to date on litigation).
14. See generally John P. Gould, The Economics of Legal Conflicts, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 279
(1973) (applying the economic model to the disposition of lawsuits).
15. See generally George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litiga-
tion, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984) (presenting an economic model of the litigation process that
assesses which cases settle and which cases go to trial).
16. See generally William M. Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 J.L. & ECoN.
61 (1971) (developing an economic model of the trial-versus-settlement decision in the criminal
justice system).
17. See Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Ad-
ministration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399, 399 (1973) (applying "the powerful tools of economic the-
ory" to "an understanding of the operating principles of the system for resolving legal disputes").
18. See generally Priest & Klein, supra note 15.
19. See generally Cooter & Rubinfeld, supra note 13.
20. See Steven Shavell, Suit, Settlement, and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis Under Alternative
Methods for the Allocation of Legal Costs, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 55, 56 (1982) (developing a "sim-
ple" economic model of the litigation process to assess allocation of legal costs).
21. An economically rational person "has three properties. (a) He is completely informed.
(b) He is infinitely sensitive. (c) He is rational." Ward Edwards, The Theory of Decision Making,
51 PSYCHOL. BULL. 380, 381 (1954). "The crucial fact about economic man is that he is rational.
This means two things: He can weakly order the states into which he can get, and he makes his
choices so as to maximize something." Id.
22. See, e.g., Cooter & Rubinfeld, supra note 13, at 1076 (analyzing risk neutrality and risk
aversion); Posner, supra note 17, at 418 n.28 ("assum[ing] risk neutrality"); Shavell, supra note
20, at 58 ("Most of the analysis that follows will focus on the case where both parties are risk
neutral."); Peter J. van Koppen, Risk Taking in Civil Law Negotiations, 14 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
151, 152 (1990) ("In studies of the decision to settle or to sue, it is usually assumed that parties
are risk neutral; that is, that parties are biased neither towards continuing negotiations nor to-
wards breaking off negotiations.").
23. See, e.g., Cooter & Rubinfeld, supra note 13, at 1076 (analyzing risk neutrality and risk
aversion); W. Kip Viscusi, Product Liability Litigation with Risk Aversion, 17 J. LEGAL STUD.
101, 103 (1988) (assessing in products liability litigation "how the decisions to drop and to settle
a claim are affected by risk aversion, as well as how risk aversion affects the settlement
amounts").
24. See, e.g., Priest & Klein, supra note 15, at 4 ("According to our model, the determi-
nants of settlement and litigation are solely economic, including the expected costs to parties of
favorable or adverse decisions, the information that parties possess about the likelihood of suc-
cess at trial, and the direct costs of litigation and settlement. The most important assumption of
the model is that potential litigants form rational estimates of the likely decision .... ); Shavell,
supra note 20, at 56-57 ("If the plaintiff does decide to bring suit, it is assumed that he and the
defendant will reach a settlement if and only if there exists some settlement amount that both he
and the defendant would prefer to going to trial.").
25. See sources cited supra note 24.
No. 1]
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litigating a case to a verdict generally exceed the costs of settlement,26
the Economic Theory predicts that litigants settle most civil cases be-
cause of the cost savings they obtain.27 This "outcome maximization"
theory of litigation behavior is based on the modern era's dominant
theory of decision making, the expected utility theory.28
Rooted in ancient Greek philosophy29 and seventeenth-century
Swiss mathematics,3" expected utility theory31 was "founded" by John
26. In fact, the cost of trial generally exceeds the cost of settlement by such a substantial
amount that many economic theorists assume the cost of settlement is zero. See, e.g., Cooter &
Rubinfeld, supra note 13, at 1075 (noting that "trial costs are so much greater than settlement
costs that many authors choose the simplifying assumption that settlement costs are nil").
27. For a lucid, nontechnical account of the Economic Theory, see Janet Cooper Alexan-
der, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV.
497, 501-02 (1991). Cooper explains:
In this model, the parties make decisions about settlement based on rational estimates of
the expected economic value of the case, including the costs of litigation. Before trial, each
side determines the expected value of the case by multiplying the amount of the expected
judgment if the plaintiff wins by the estimated probability of a plaintiff's verdict. Each party
makes its settlement decisions by comparing its expected economic position after a trial with
its position if the settlement proposal is accepted, taking into account the costs of litigation
and settlement.
Id.; see also Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Getting to No: A Study of Settlement Negotia-
tions and the Selection of Cases for Trial, 90 MICH. L. REV. 319, 324 (1991). They state:
[The Priest & Klein Economic Model] assume[s] that the parties will settle whenever the
defendant's maximum offer is greater than the plaintiffs minimum demand. Because litiga-
tion costs are added to the defendant's maximum offer and subtracted from the plaintiff's
minimum demand, settlement will normally occur. Indeed, if plaintiffs and defendants al-
ways agreed in their predictions of trial outcomes, there would be no trials at all.
Id.
28. See, e.g., PAUL ANAND, FOUNDATIONS OF RATIONAL CHOICE UNDER RISK 131 (1993)
("There can be few theories that would appear to be so important in so many disciplines.");
JANET LANDMAN, REGRET: THE PERSISTENCE OF THE POSSIBLE 117 (1993) ("By now utilitarian
decision theory has achieved canonical status."); R. J. Hermstein, Rational Choice Theory: Nec-
essary but Not Sufficient, 45 AM. PSYCHOL. 356, 356 (1990) ("Not just economics, but all the
disciplines dealing with behavior, from political philosophy to behavioral biology, rely increas-
ingly on the idea that humans and other organisms tend to maximize utility, as formalized in
modem economic theory .... The scattered dissenters to the theory are often viewed as just
that-scattered and mere dissenters to an orthodoxy almost as entrenched as a religious
dogma."); John C. Hershey & Jonathan Baron, Clinical Reasoning and Cognitive Processes, 7
MED. DECISION MAKING 203, 203 (1987) (noting that expected utility theory "is generally ac-
cepted, having formed the basis in the last 40 years for virtually all theoretical and applied re-
search in economics, finance, insurance, marketing, and gambling"); Mark J. Machina, Decision-
Making in the Presence of Risk, 236 SCIENCE 537, 537 (1987) (arguing that the expected utility
theory has "become the dominant, and indeed, almost exclusive model of decision-making under
risk in economics, operations research, philosophy, and statistical decision theory");
Schoemaker, supra note 6, at 529 ("It is no exaggeration to consider expected utility theory the
major paradigm in decision making since the Second World War.").
29. See LANDMAN, supra note 28, at 117 ("The roots of modem economic decision theory
run nearly as deep as those of the Socratic principle, going back at least as far as the philosopher
Epicurus (c. 270), who formulated a hedonistic principle that identified the good with the plea-
surable. In ethical hedonism, the normative principle is to do what will afford one the greatest
pleasure.").
30. See Milton Friedman & L. J. Savage, The Utility Analysis of Choice Involving Risk, 56
J. POL. ECON. 279, 281 (1948) ("The idea that choices among alternatives involving risk can be
explained by the maximization of expected utility is ancient, dating back at least to D. Ber-
noulli's celebrated analysis of the St. Petersburg paradox."). For a discussion of the St. Peters-
burg Paradox-which was posed by Nicolas Bernoulli and "solved" by his nephew Daniel
Bernoulli-see generally ANAND, supra note 28, at 3-5; LEONARD J. SAVAGE, THE FOUNDA-
[Vol. 1999
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von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern 31 in 1944."3 Von Neumann and
Morgenstern proposed expected utility theory "as a normative model
of an idealized decision maker, not as a description of the behavior of
real people,"34 though other scholars have developed descriptive ex-
pected utility theories purporting to explain actual human decision
making.35
TIONS OF STATISTICS 91-95 (1954). Gabriel Cramer and Christianus Huygens are also credited
with unraveling the St. Petersburg Paradox. See ANAND, supra note 28, at 3 n.3; Mark J.
Machina, Choice Under Uncertainty: Problems Solved and Unsolved, in THE LIMrrs OF RATION-
ALITY 90, 91 (Karen Schweers Cook & Margaret Levi eds., 1990).
31. Expected utility theory is variously referred to as "subjective expected utility theory,"
e.g., ANAND, supra note 28, at 1; "modern utilitarianism," "'optimal choice' theory," "' rational
choice' theory," and "standard or classic decision theory," LANDMAN, supra note 28, at 117; "the
economic theory of rational choice," Herrnstein, supra note 28, at 356; and the "'rational model'
of decisionmaking," Rachlinski, supra note 8, at 116 n.1l.
32. Others credited with the founding of modern expected utility theory include Frank
Ramsey and Leonard Savage. See Machina, supra note 28, at 537.
33. See generally JOHN VON NEUMANN & OSKAR MORGENSTERN, THE THEORY OF GAMES
AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR (1944). Expected utility theory rests on several mathematical princi-
ples or axioms that purportedly characterize ideal, rational decision making. See id. at 24-29;
Herrnstein, supra note 28, at 357 ("[Rlational choice theorists have formalized utility maximiza-
tion, reducing it to its axiomatic foundations.").
Scholars disagree about the number and characterization of the principles or axioms under-
lying the theory. Duncan Luce, for instance, contends that "there are just four major behavioral
principles that have been invoked for normative theorizing," R. Duncan Luce, Where Does Sub-
jective Expected Utility Fail Descriptively?, 5 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 5, 8 (1992), while Richard
Thaler identifies "fifteen specific principles of rationality." Richard H. Thaler, The Psychology of
Choice and the Assumptions of Economics, in QUASI-RATIONAL ECONOMICS 137, 138 (Richard
H. Thaler ed., 1991) [hereinafter Thaler, Psychology]. According to Jeffrey Harrison, "[t]he cen-
tral concept of rationality is dominance or transitivity. That is, if A is preferred to B, and B is
preferred to C, then A is preferred to C." Jeffrey L. Harrison, Egoism, Altruism, and Market
Illusions: The Limits of Law and Economics, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1309, 1315 n.26 (1986). See
generally Scorr PLOUS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 81-82 (1993);
Tversky & Kahneman, Rational Choice, supra note 9, at S252-53.
34. Tversky & Kahneman, Rational Choice, supra note 9, at S251; see also PLOUS, supra
note 33, at 80 ("Von Neumann and Morgenstern proposed expected utility theory as a 'norma-
tive' theory of behavior. That is, classical utility theory was not intended to describe how people
actually behave, but how people would behave if they followed certain requirements of rational
decision making."). But see Jean Hampton, The Failure of Expected-Utility Theory as a Theory of
Reason, 10 ECON. & PHIL. 195, 209 (1994) (arguing that "the theory as it was originally devel-
oped can only be understood as a purely predictive theory, and not a descriptive or normative
theory").
35. In his 1982 review of expected utility theory, Schoemaker identifies nine "variants" of
expected utility theory, two of which (von Neumann & Morgenstern's and Leonard Savage's) he
identifies as "normative," and the others of which he identifies as descriptive. See Schoemaker,
supra note 6, at 537-38; see also PLOUS, supra note 33, at 83 (noting that "[e]xpected utility
theory is actually a family of theories (although 'expected utility theory' is often used as a short-
hand reference to the theory developed by von Neumann and Morgenstern)"); Ward Edwards &
Detlof von Winterfeldt, On Cognitive Illusions and Their Implications, in JUDGMENT AND DECI-
SION MAKING: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY READER 642, 662-63 (Hal R. Arkes & Kenneth R. Ham-
mond eds., 1986) (noting that expected utility theories take both descriptive and prescriptive
form); William Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Decision Making, 1 J.
RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7, 7 (1988) ("Current economic thinking embraces the concept of rational
choice as a prescriptive and descriptive paradigm."); Thaler, Psychology, supra note 33, at 137
("Neoclassical economics is based on the premise that models that characterize rational, optimiz-
ing behavior also characterize actual human behavior. The same model is used as a normative
definition of rational choice and a descriptive predictor of observed choice.").
No. 1]
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The central premise of the expected utility theories is that risk-
neutral36 or risk-averse37 decision makers seek to maximize expected
utility.38 An individual decision maker maximizes expected utility3 9
36. While expected utility theory usually assumes risk aversion, see infra note 37, some
expected utility models assume decision makers are risk neutral. See, e.g., ARROW, supra note 6,
at 90 (noting that "[e]xpected utility theory predicts that people make either risk-averse or risk-
neutral choices" (emphasis added)); Larry T. Garvin, Adequate Assurance of Performance: Of
Risk, Duress, and Cognition, 69 U. COLO. L. REV. 71, 152 (1998) ("Those wedded to pure ration-
ality tend to assume that economic actors are risk-neutral; if a person departs from risk-neutral-
ity, she will either forego potentially profitable economic endeavors (risk-aversion) or undertake
potentially unprofitable ones (risk-seeking).").
37. Expected utility theory usually assumes decision makers are risk averse. See, e.g., AR-
ROW, supra note 6, at 90 (noting that "[e]xpected utility theory predicts that people make either
risk-averse or risk-neutral choices" (emphasis added)); ZUR SHAPIRA, RISK TAKING: A MANA-
GERIAL PERSPECTIVE 24, 26 (1995) (noting that "[c]lassical analyses by Pratt, Arrow, and others,
as well as more recent work, assumed that individual human decision makers are risk averse"
and contending that risk aversion is one of the "two major tenets of the classical approach to risk
attitudes" (citations omitted)); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Positive Economic
Theory of Tort Law, 15 GA. L. REV. 851, 867 (1981) ("Generally, people are assumed to be risk-
averse."); Schoemaker, supra note 6, at 532 ("An important concept in EU theory is that of risk
aversion."). Expected utility theory makes this assumption even though "risk aversion is neither
an axiom of rationality nor a necessary component of economic analysis." Thaler, Psychology,
supra note 33, at 142.
While expected utility theory generally assumes risk aversion, the reasons for this assump-
tion are not entirely clear. Larrick explains that under expected utility theory, "the reason a
person is risk averse is ambiguous. It is not possible to tell whether the person actually derives
less value from additional units of money, as the 19th-century economists assumed, or whether
the person simply dislikes risk." Larrick, Motivational Factors, supra note 6, at 443. Notwith-
standing this ambiguity, most scholars attribute the risk-aversion assumption to the former,
rather than the latter, explanation. See, e.g., Garvin, supra note 36, at 152 (identifying "diminish-
ing marginal utility" as one of the explanations for the risk-aversion assumption); Daniel
Kahneman & Dan Lovallo, Timid Choices and Bold Forecasts: A Cognitive Perspective on Risk
Taking, in FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES IN STRATEGY: A RESEARCH AGENDA 71, 73 (Richard P.
Rumelt et al. eds., 1994) ("The standard interpretation of risk aversion is decreasing marginal
utility of gains."); Rachlinski, supra note 8, at 117 n.13 (attributing risk aversion to "the premise
that the first dollar one owns is more valuable than the second dollar, or the first $10,000 one
owns is more valuable than the second $10,000"); Thaler, Psychology, supra note 33, at 142
(attributing the risk-aversion assumption to diminishing marginal utility).
38. See, e.g., SAVAGE, supra note 30, at 105 (noting that under expected utility theory a
"person always decides in favor of an act the expected utility of which is as large as possible");
VON NEUMANN & MORGENSTERN, supra note 33, at 1 (seeking "to find an exact description of
the endeavor of the individual to obtain a maximum of utility"); Friedman & Savage, supra note
30, at 303 (finding that a "consumer unit (generally a family, sometimes an individual) behaves
as if... [i]t chose among alternatives involving risk that one [alternative] for which the expected
utility (as contrasted with the utility of the expected income) is largest"); Schoemaker, supra
note 6, at 531 (noting von Neumann and Morgenstern's derivation of "expected utility
maximization").
39. See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, Bringing Culture and Human Frailty to Rational Actors:
A Critique of Classical Law and Economics, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 23, 23 (1989). Ellickson
states:
The economists' model, in its purest form, is based on elegantly simple propositions about
both cognitive capacities and motivations. The model assumes that a person can perfectly
process available information about alternative courses of action, and can rank possible
outcomes in order of expected utility. The model also assumes that an actor will choose the
course of action that will maximize his personal expected utility ....
Id.; see, e.g., J. St. B.T. Evans, Bias and Rationality, in RATIONALITY: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND
PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES 6, 8 (K.I. Manktelow & D.E. Over eds., 1993). Evans explains:
The basic principle which drives this theory is the assumption that people choose in such a
way as to maximize expected utility-in other words to maximize the benefit or minimize
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when he selects the decision option that is the most attractive to him 40
or that provides him with the most "utiles."41
When selecting between decision options with certain out-
comes-e.g., when choosing one of two certain cash prizes, or when
deciding whether to buy a mystery or a science fiction novel-utility
maximization is easy. To maximize utility under such conditions of
certainty,42 the decision maker simply calculates the utility ("U")43 of
the cost to themselves .... Each choice is associated with one or more possible outcomes
which will occur with a given probability and which have a utility for the decision maker
.... The action with the highest expected utility is the one chosen.
Id.
40. Utility is a "subjective" construct, see, e.g., Evans, supra note 39, at 8; Edwards & von
Winterfeldt, supra note 35, at 663 (noting that utility is "a subjective measure"), susceptible to
quantification. See SAVAGE, supra note 30, at 69 (noting that utility is a function that "arithme-
tizes the relation of preference among acts"); VON NEUMANN & MORGENSTERN, supra note 33,
at 16 (noting that expected utility theory treats "utilities as numerically measurable quantities").
Utility is variously defined as "a quantity defined so as to represent preferences," John
Broome, Comment: Should a Rational Agent Maximize Expected Utility?, in THE LIMITS OF RA-
TIONALITY, supra note 30, at 132, 134, "a person's good," id., "the attractiveness of a' possible
outcome to the decision maker(s)," Edwards & von Winterfeldt, supra note 35, at 663, or
"'wantability,"' Daniel Kahneman, New Challenges to the Rationality Assumption, 3 LEGAL THE-
ORY 105, 107 (1997) [hereinafter Kahneman, New Challenges].
"The notion of utility is roughly this," explain Frederick Mosteller and Philip Nogee. "Indi-
viduals behave as if they had a subjective scale of values for assessing the worth to them of
different amounts of commodities, and this scale is not necessarily merely a stretching or a trans-
lation of the 'physical' scale in use in the market place." Frederick Mosteller & Philip Nogee, An
Experimental Measurement of Utility, 59 J. POL. ECON. 371, 371 (1951).
41. A "utile" is "the usual name for the unit of utility." Edwards, supra .note 21, at 392.
42. Decision theorists normally recognize three types of decision-making situations: cer-
tainty, risk, and uncertainty. See, e.g., SHAPIRA, supra note 37, at 4. Certainty obtains "where
each action is known to lead invariably to a particular outcome." Id. Risk obtains "where each
action leads to a few known outcomes, each of which occurs with a specific probability." Id.
(emphasis added). Uncertainty obtains "where each action may lead to a set of consequences,
yet the probabilities of these outcomes are unknown." Id. (emphasis added).
While decision theorists recognize a distinction between "risk" and "uncertainty," the terms
"are often used interchangeably." Lola L. Lopes, Psychology and Economics: Perspectives on
Risk, Cooperation, and the Marketplace, 45 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 197, 199 & n.1 (1994) [herein-
after Lopes, Psychology]; see also FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT 19-20,
197-232 (1921) (the classic treatment); Lola L. Lopes, Between Hope and Fear: The Psychology
of Risk, 20 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOL. 255, 256 (1987) [hereinafter Lopes,
Hope] (noting that "risk shades into ignorance and most important decisions are made part way
between the poles"); R. Duncan Luce & Howard Raiffa, Utility Theory, in RATIONALITY IN
ACTION: CONTEMPORARY APPROACHES 19, 39 (Paul K. Moser ed., 1990) (recognizing "a mix-
ture of uncertainty and risk" as a fourth decision-making situation). Thus, "risky choice" is often
"the term used conventionally to refer to all but the most extreme instances of ignorance or
ambiguity." Lopes, Hope, supra, at 256.
Because this article is about litigation decisions-e.g., whether to accept a settlement offer
or proceed to trial-the focus of my analysis will be on decision making under risky conditions.
43. I use the term "utility" rather than "expected utility" because when making decisions
under certain or riskless conditions, as here, a decision maker "has usually been assumed to
maximize utility," whereas in uncertain or risky conditions, "he is assumed to maximize expected
utility." Edwards, supra note 21, at 381 (emphasis added); see also Paul K. Moser, Rationality in
Action: General Introduction, in RATIONALITY IN ACTION: CONTEMPORARY APPROACHES,
supra note 42, at 1, 3. Moser states:
When a decision maker is certain about the outcomes of his or her actions relative to actual
states of the world... [he or she] need only invoke his or her ordinal ranking of outcomes
based on personal preferences; the decision maker need only choose the action that has the
highest utility on his or her ranking.
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each decision option and selects the one that is greatest.44 If, for ex-
ample, the utility of decision option "x" exceeds the utility of decision
option "y" (U, > Uy), the decision maker will select decision option
"X."45
Utility maximization is not so easy, however, when one or more
of the options available to the decision maker is uncertain or risky.
When making decisions under conditions of risk or uncertainty46 -
e.g., choosing one medical treatment over another, accepting a settle-
ment offer or facing the uncertainty of trial-a decision maker consid-
ers not only the utility of each option but also the probability that it
will occur if selected. To maximize expected utility under such condi-
tions, a decision maker performs two analytical tasks:
First, he calculates the expected utility of each decision option by
multiplying its utility ("U") by the probability that it will occur ("P").
The expected utility ("EU") of decision option "x," for example, is the
utility of "x" times the probability "x" will occur: EU = UxP.
Second, he compares the expected utility of each decision option
and selects the one that is greatest. If, for example, the expected utility
of decision option "x" exceeds the expected utility of decision option
"y" (EUx > EUy), the decision maker will select decision option "x."
Consider the following:
Problem #1: Suppose that a decision maker is asked to choose
between (a) a certain $5,000 cash prize, and (b) a 50% chance of
receiving a $10,000 cash prize (with a corresponding 50% chance
of receiving $0).
The expected value of each decision option in Problem #1 is the
same. That is, the value of option (a) is $5,000 (i.e., $5,000 x 100%
probability = $5,000), and the value of option (b) is also $5,000 (i.e.,
$10,000 x 50% probability plus $0 x 50% probability = $5,000). Be-
cause expected utility theory predicts that decision makers select the
decision option that promises the greatest outcome, the theory
Id. But see Luce & Raiffa, supra note 42, at 22 (criticizing the use of the term "utility" when
describing decision making under conditions of certainty or risklessness).
44. The decision maker need not explicitly factor "probability" into his "decision equation"
under conditions of certainty. Under such conditions, the probability that each option will occur
is 100%. Under the formal "cancellation" axiom, see generally supra note 33, the rational deci-
sion maker recognizes that because the probability of each option is identical (i.e., 100%), the
probabilities cancel each other out and are not taken into account when selecting between them.
45. Despite his reservations about the validity of expected utility theory as a descriptive
theory, Hermstein agrees that it "accords with common sense in certain simple settings." Herrn-
stein, supra note 28, at 357. "For example," Herrnstein offers,
consider a choice between $5 and $10, no strings attached. Any theory of behavior must
come up with the right answer here, where there seems to be no issue of obscure motives, or
of errors of reckoning, remembering, knowing, and so on. Assuming only that more money
has more utility than less money, rational choice theory does come up with it. To argue
against rationality as a fundamental behavioral principle seems to be arguing against self-
evident truth.
46. See supra note 42.
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predicts that our decision maker in Problem #1 will be indifferent be-
tween the two decision options if he is risk neutral or will prefer the
$5,000 cash prize if he is risk averse. Expected utility theory predicts
that he will not select the 50% chance at the $10,000 prize.
Now consider the following:
Problem #2: Suppose that our decision maker is asked to choose
between (a) paying a $5,000 fine, and (b) facing a 50% chance of
paying a $10,000 fine (with a corresponding 50% chance of pay-
ing no fine).
The expected value of each decision option in Problem #2 is also
the same. That is, the value of option (a) is -$5,000 (i.e., -$5,000 x
100% probability = -$5,000), and the value of option (b) is also -$5,000
(i.e., -$10,000 x 50% probability plus $0 x 50% probability = -$5,000).
Because expected utility theory predicts that decision makers select
the decision option that promises the greatest outcome, the theory
predicts that our decision maker in Problem #2 will be indifferent be-
tween the two decision options if he is risk neutral or will prefer to
pay the certain $5,000 fine if he is risk averse. Expected utility theory
predicts that he will not risk the 50% chance at having to pay the
$10,000 fine.
In either situation, expected utility theory assumes that decision
makers compare the expected utility of the decision options available
to them and select the one that offers the greatest outcome. This is
true regardless of whether the options represent gains (e.g., $5,000
prize or a 50% chance of a $10,000 prize) or losses (e.g., $5,000 fine or
a 50% chance of a $10,000 fine) from a prior position.
Borrowing expected utility theory's central premise,47 the Eco-
nomic Theory of Suit and Settlement predicts that litigants, like deci-
sion makers generally, seek to maximize outcomes. Consider a simple
litigation example:
Problem #3: Suppose that our decision maker is Plaintiff in a
breach of contract suit against Defendant. Following discovery,
Plaintiff's lawyer estimates Plaintiff has a 50% chance of winning
a $50,000 judgment at trial (and a 50% chance of not winning
anything). Suppose further that Defendant has made a final set-
tlement offer of $25,000 to Plaintiff. Thus, Plaintiff faces a choice
between (a) a certain $25,000 settlement, and (b) a 50% chance
of winning $50,000 at trial (with a corresponding 50% chance of
winning $0).
The expected value of each decision option in Problem #3 is the
same. That is, the value of the settlement is $25,000 (i.e., $25,000 x
100% probability = $25,000), and the value of trial is also $25,000 (i.e.,
$50,000 x 50% probability plus $0 x 50% probability = $25,000). Be-
cause the Economic Theory predicts that litigants decide whether to
47. See supra text accompanying note 38.
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settle a case or go to trial based on the value of each option, the the-
ory predicts that Plaintiff in Problem #3 will be indifferent between
the two decision options if she is risk neutral or will accept the settle-
ment offer if she is risk averse.
Now consider Problem #3 from the perspective of the defendant
rather than the plaintiff:
Problem #4: Suppose that our decision maker is Defendant in a
breach of contract suit filed by Plaintiff. Following discovery, De-
fendant's lawyer estimates Defendant has a 50% chance of losing
a $50,000 judgment at trial (and a 50% chance of not losing any-
thing). Suppose further that Plaintiff has demanded $25,000 to
settle the case. Thus, Defendant faces a choice between (a) pay-
ing a certain $25,000 settlement, and (b) facing a 50% chance of
losing $50,000 at trial (with a corresponding 50% chance of losing
$0).
In Problem #4, as in Problem #3, the expected value of each deci-
sion option is the same. That is, the value of the settlement to Defend-
ant is -$25,000 (i.e., -$25,000 x 100% probability = -$25,000), and the
value of trial is also -$25,000 (i.e., -$50,000 x 50% probability plus $0 x
50% probability = -$25,000). Because the Economic Theory predicts
that litigants decide whether to settle a case or go to trial based on the
value of each option, the theory predicts that Defendant will be indif-
ferent between the two decision options if she is risk neutral or will
accept the settlement offer if she is risk averse.
In either situation the Economic Theory assumes that litigants
compare the value of settlement to the value of trial and select the one
that promises the most value, regardless of whether the options repre-
sent gains (as they do to Plaintiff) or losses (as they do to Defendant).
In short, the Economic Theory of Suit and Settlement, drawing from
expected utility theory, predicts that litigants behave as economically
rational actors who calculate the costs and benefits of litigation op-
tions and select the one that is greatest.48
B. The Framing Theory of Litigation
The Framing Theory of Litigation-promulgated by Jeff Rachlin-
ski 49 and others5 0-"do[es] not question the basic premise [of the
Economic Theory] that litigants try to achieve the best possible out-
come." 51 Rather, the Framing Theory "question[s] their ability to
48. When the expected value of the litigation options is the same, litigants are either indif-
ferent between the options or prefer the certain one over the uncertain one. See supra text
accompanying note 47.
49. See generally Rachlinski, supra note 8.
50. See generally, e.g., Babcock et al., supra note 8; Korobkin & Guthrie, Psychological
Barriers, supra note 8.
51. Rachlinski, supra note 8, at 118.
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identify the most favorable options when risk and uncertainty are
involved."52
The Framing Theory predicts that litigants will behave differently
depending upon how a litigation decision is "framed." Rather than
simply comparing options to one another and selecting the larger of
the two, litigants evaluate decision options relative to a reference
point and make risk-averse decisions when choosing between gains
and risk-seeking decisions when choosing between losses.5 3 When de-
ciding whether to settle a case or go to trial, the Framing Theory
predicts that plaintiffs are likely to behave in a risk-averse fashion be-
cause they view both settlement and trial as gains from their prior
position, while defendants are more likely to exhibit risk-seeking ten-
dencies because they view both settlement and trial as losses from
their prior position.54
The Framing Theory is based on prospect theory, the leading
challenger to the expected utility theory of decision making.55 While
economists, mathematicians, and statisticians fashioned expected util-
ity theory via an "armchair method" 56-that is, "[t]hey ma[d]e as-
sumptions, and from these assumptions they deduce[d] theorems""-
52. Id.
53. See, e.g., Babcock et al., supra note 8, at 296-97 (noting that their experimental results
"suggest that people's risk attitudes may depend on how decisions are framed"); Rachlinski,
supra note 8, at 128, also notes:
[L]itigation decisions are influenced by the risk preferences of the parties, which, in turn,
are determined by the character of the decision as a gain or as a loss. Predicting the behav-
ior of litigants therefore requires an understanding of whether a party views their decision
from the perspective of a gain or loss.
54. See, e.g., Babcock et al., supra note 8, at 296-97. Babcock argues:
A decision task framed in terms of potential gains typically produces risk averse behavior,
whereas a decision task framed in terms of potential losses will be more likely to yield risk
seeking behavior. The [sic] raises the possibility that plaintiffs, who are facing what may be
perceived as gains, will exhibit risk aversion, whereas defendants, who may perceive poten-
tial losses, will be (relatively) more risk seeking. In fact, we find that subjects assuming the
plaintiff's role are almost all risk averse while a substantial fraction of subjects assuming the
defendant's role are risk seeking.
Id.; see also, e.g., Korobkin & Guthrie, Psychological Barriers, supra note 8, at 109, who state:
[W]e predict that settlement rates will depend on whether the offeree understands a given
settlement offer as a gain or loss. If an offeree views accepting an offer as a gain, he is likely
to prefer settlement-the less risky alternative-to trial; if he sees the offer as a losing prop-
osition, he is likely to prefer trial-the more risky option.
Id.; see also, e.g., Rachlinski, supra note 8, at 129, who contends,
Litigation appears to supply a natural frame. When deciding whether to settle a case, plain-
tiffs consistently choose between a sure gain by settling and the prospect of winning more at
trial. This closely resembles a gains frame, although losing at trial may entail the loss of
one's attorneys fees and may therefore be a mixed loss/gain prospect. Conversely, defend-
ants choose between a sure loss by settling and the prospect of losing more at trial. This is a
choice made in a loss frame. Hence, cross-claims aside, litigation presents a fairly consistent
frame.
55. See, e.g., PLoUs, supra note 33, at 95 ("Many alternatives to expected utility theory
have been proposed ... but the most widely accepted is 'prospect theory."'); Rachlinski, supra
note 8. at 121 (referring to prospect theory as '[t]he leading example of a behavioral decision
theory model of choice"). •
56. Edwards, supra note 21, at 381.
57. Id.
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the cognitive psychologists who "founded" prospect theory, Daniel
Kahneman and Amos Tversky,5 s relied on empirical evidence both to
demonstrate that decision makers "systematically violate the axioms
of expected utility theory"5 9 and to propose their "alternative account
of choice under risk."60 Thus, Kahneman and Tversky's prospect the-
ory is a "behavioral decision theory"61 that purports to describe how
58. See supra note 9.
59. Kahneman & Tversky, Prospect Theory, supra note 9, at 263. Kahneman and Tversky,
as well as others, have offered sufficient empirical evidence demonstrating that decision makers
do not behave in accord with expected utility theory's underlying axioms, see supra note 33, to
prompt Herrnstein to write that "[e]xperimental findings by many decision researchers have
undermined the descriptive form of the theory by discovering choice phenomena that are consis-
tent with (or at least not inconsistent with) principles of cognitive psychology, but inconsistent
with rationality as commonly construed." Herrnstein, supra note 28, at 357; see also ANAND,
supra note 28, at 131 ("[Tlhe pressure for a substantial re-evaluation of its status is becoming
harder to resist. The numerous and systematic experimental falsifications of SEU's axioms are
now broadly accepted."); Garvin, supra note 36, at 145 ("Cognitive psychology and experimental
economics have found a smorgasbord of cognitive errors, which collectively falsify most of the
axioms of rational choice theory."); Schoemaker, supra note 6, at 552. Schoemaker states:
[A]t the individual level EU maximization is more the exception than the rule .... As a
descriptive model seeking insight into how decisions are made, EU theory fails on at least
three counts. First, people do not structure problems as holistically and comprehensively as
EU theory suggests. Second, they do not process information, especially probabilities, ac-
cording to the EU rule. Finally, EU theory, as an "as if" model, poorly predicts choice
behavior in laboratory situations. Hence, it is doubtful that the EU theory should or could
serve as a general descriptive model.
Id.
60. Kahneman & Tversky, Prospect Theory, supra note 9, at 263.
61. Behavioral decision theory "incorporates empirical observations of judgment and
choice into a model of decisionmaking." Rachlinski, supra note 8, at 121. "What has character-
ized the field both historically and theoretically is the comparison of actual decision making with
certain principles of rationality in decision making." Robyn M. Dawes, Behavioral Decision
Making and Judgment, in 1 THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 497, 497 (Daniel T. Gil-
bert et al. eds., 4th ed. 1998). "When actual decisions violate such principles systematically (not
just as a result of unreliability or 'error'), this deviation is termed an anomaly ...." Id. The
earliest contributors to behavioral decision theory included those like Allais and Ellsberg who
uncovered the first such anomalies. See Richard H. Thaler, The Psychology and Economics Con-
ference Handbook, in QUAsi-RATIONAL ECONOMICS, supra note 33, at 189, 191. More recent
contributors include Kahneman and Tversky, founders of prospect theory. See supra note 9.
While behavioral decision theory "appears diametrically opposed" to the normative ration-
ality theory, "this appearance is misleading" because behavioral decision theory has "retained
the normative kernel of the classical view." Gerd Gigerenzer & Daniel G. Goldstein, Reasoning
the Fast and Frugal Way: Models of Bounded Rationality, 103 PSYCHOL. REV. 650, 650 (1996).
"For example, a discrepancy between the dictates of rationality and actual reasoning is what
defines a reasoning error in this program. Both views accept the laws of probability and statistics
as normative, but they disagree about whether humans can stand up to these norms." Id.
For overviews of the application of behavioral decision theory to law, see generally Chris-
tine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998);
Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral Theories of Judgment and Decision-Making in Legal Scholar-
ship: A Literature Review, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1499 (1998); Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis
of Law, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1997) [hereinafter Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis]. Though still
"at its inception," the "behavioral analysis of law" or "behavioral law and economics" field is
"showing signs of considerable growth." Cass R. Sunstein et al., Assessing Punitive Damages
(with Notes on Cognition and Valuation in Law), 107 YALE L.J. 2071, 2074 (1998). But see gener-
ally Mark Kelman, Behavioral Economics as Part of a Rhetorical Duet: A Response to Joss, Sun-
stein, and Thaler, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1577 (1998); Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral
Economics, and the Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1551 (1998).
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individuals actually make decisions rather than how they would make
decisions if they were "rational."
Prospect theory "assumes decisions are based on changes in
wealth rather than on final states of wealth."62 The central premise of
prospect theory is that individual decision makers code decision op-
tions as gains or losses from a reference point63 and make risk-averse
choices when selecting between gains and risk-seeking choices when
selecting between losses.64
To illustrate, reconsider Problems #1 and #2 discussed above:
Problem #1: Suppose that a decision maker is asked to choose
between (a) a certain $5,000 cash prize, and (b) a 50% chance of
receiving a $10,000 cash prize (with a corresponding 50% chance
of receiving $0).
Problem #2: Suppose that our decision maker is asked to choose
between (a) paying a $5,000 fine, and (b) facing a 50% chance of
paying a $10,000 fine (with a corresponding 50% chance of pay-
ing no fine).
Recall that expected utility theory predicts that our decision maker
will evaluate the two problems the same way. In both problems, ex-
pected utility theory predicts he will be indifferent between options
(a) and (b) if he is risk neutral, or he will select option (a) if he is risk
averse.
Prospect theory, by contrast, predicts that our decision maker will
evaluate the two problems quite differently. Prospect theory contends
in Problem #1 that our decision maker will code each option as a
gain-i.e., a $5,000 prize versus a 50% chance at a $10,000 prize.
When selecting between options that appear to represent gains, as in
Problem #1, prospect theory predicts that our decision maker will
make the risk-averse selection-i.e., that he will choose option (a). In
62. Larrick, Motivational Factors, supra note 6, at 442 (emphasis added).
63. See Daniel Kahneman, Reference Points, Anchors, Norms, and Mixed Feelings, 51 OR-
GANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 296, 296 (1992) [hereinafter Kahneman,
Reference] ("Reference points are important because other outcomes are compared to them,
and are coded and evaluated in terms of this comparison."); Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tver-
sky, The Psychology of Preferences, 246 Sci. AM. 160, 161 (1982) [hereinafter Kahneman &
Tversky, Psychology of Preferences] ("[W]e propose that people commonly adopt a limited view
of the outcomes of decisions: they identify consequences as gains or losses relative to a neutral
point.").
64. Another key premise of prospect theory is loss aversion, which refers to the phenome-
non that "losses generally loom larger than the corresponding gains." Daniel Kahneman &
Amos Tversky, Conflict Resolution: A Cognitive Perspective, in BARRIERS TO CONFLICT RESO-
LUtION 43, 54 (Kenneth J. Arrow et al. eds., 1995). In their original article, Kahneman and
Tversky explained the central propositions of prospect theory as follows: "the value function is
(i) defined on deviations from the reference point; (ii) generally concave for gains and com-
monly convex for losses; (iii) steeper for losses than for gains." Kahneman & Tversky, Prospect
Theory, supra note 9, at 279. Subsequent formulations include Tversky & Kahneman, Cumula-
tive Representation, supra note 9, at 297-98 ("The key elements of [prospect] theory are 1) a
value function that is concave for gains, convex for losses, and steeper for losses than for gains,
and 2) a non-linear transformation of the probability scale, which overweighs small probabilities
and underweighs moderate and high probabilities.").
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Problem #2, by contrast, prospect theory predicts that our decision
maker will code each option as a loss-i.e., a $5,000 fine versus a 50%
chance at a $10,000 fine. When selecting between options that appear
to represent losses, as in Problem #2, prospect theory predicts that our
decision maker will make the risk-seeking selection-i.e., that he will
choose option (b). 65 In short, prospect theory posits that "[p]eople do
not normally think of relatively small outcomes in terms of states of
wealth," as the expected utility theory maintains, "but rather in terms
of gains, losses, and neutral outcomes. ' 66 That is, "people tend to ac-
cept the frame presented in a problem and evaluate the outcome in
terms of that frame.",
67
Borrowing prospect theory's central premise,68 the Framing The-
ory of Litigation predicts that litigants, like other decision makers,
code options as gains or losses from a reference point and make risk-
averse choices when selecting between gains and risk-seeking choices
when selecting between losses. Reconsider the simple litigation
problems described above:
Problem #3: Suppose that our decision maker is Plaintiff in a
breach of contract suit against Defendant. Following discovery,
Plaintiff's lawyer estimates Plaintiff has a 50% chance of winning
a $50,000 judgment at trial (and a 50% chance of not winning
anything). Suppose further that Defendant has made a final set-
tlement offer of $25,000 to Plaintiff. Thus, she faces a choice be-
tween (a) a certain $25,000 settlement, and (b) a 50% chance of
winning $50,000 at trial (with a corresponding 50% chance of
winning $0).
Problem #4: Suppose that our decision maker is Defendant in the
breach of contract suit filed by Plaintiff. Following discovery, De-
fendant's lawyer estimates Defendant has a 50% chance of losing
a $50,000 judgment at trial (and a 50% chance of not losing any-
thing). Suppose further that Plaintiff has demanded $25,000 to
settle the case. Thus, Defendant faces a choice between (a) pay-
ing a certain $25,000 settlement, and (b) facing a 50% chance of
losing $50,000 at trial (with a corresponding 50% chance of losing
$0).
Recall that the Economic Theory predicts that Plaintiff and Defend-
ant will evaluate the two problems identically. That is, in both
problems, the Economic Theory predicts that the litigants will either
be indifferent between settlement and trial or will prefer settlement to
65. In a series of hypothetical choice problems similar to Problems #1 and #2 above,
Kahneman and Tversky found substantial support for prospect theory's predictions regarding an
individual decision maker's behavior in such risky choice situations. See, e.g., Kahneman & Tver-
sky, Choices, supra note 6, at 344.
66. Id. at 342.
67. Amos Tversky, Contrasting Rational and Psychological Principles of Choice, in WISE
CHOICES 5, 8 (Richard J. Zeckhauser et al. eds., 1996).
68. See supra text accompanying note 64.
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trial. Relying on prospect theory's empirical observations regarding
decision making under risky circumstances, the Framing Theory, by
contrast, predicts that Plaintiff and Defendant will evaluate these
problems differently.
The Framing Theory predicts that Plaintiff in Problem #3 will
code both settlement and trial as gains from her prior position-i.e., a
$25,000 settlement versus a 50% chance at a $50,000 trial judgment.
When selecting between gains-as plaintiffs generally do 69-the
Framing Theory predicts that Plaintiff will make the risk-averse selec-
tion-i.e., that she will choose to settle. By contrast, the Framing The-
ory predicts that Defendant in Problem #4 will code both settlement
and trial as losses from her prior position-i.e., a $25,000 settlement
payment versus a 50% chance at a $50,000 adverse trial judgment.
When selecting between losses-as defendants generally must7 0 -the
Framing Theory predicts that Defendant will make the risk-seeking
selection-i.e., that she will be inclined to try the case rather than set-
tle. In short, the Framing Theory predicts, and demonstrates,71 that
"framing alters the risk preferences of litigants. '' 72 Namely, "[p]eople
facing potential losses from litigation ma[k]e riskier choices than peo-
ple facing potential gains." 73
C. The Limitation of the Existing Theories
The Economic Theory of Suit and Settlement-which posits that
litigants seek solely to select the litigation option that promises the
greatest return 71-is a remarkably durable theory of litigation behav-
ior with considerable intuitive 75 and even some empirical support. 76
The Framing Theory of Litigation-which accepts the Economic The-
ory's view that litigants seek to maximize outcomes but contends that
they are unable to do so because the litigation frame systematically
biases them77-is increasingly influential78 and is supported by a ro-
69. The Framing Theory assumes that plaintiffs typically choose between gains and defend-
ants between losses because "people internalize losses and gains relatively quickly." Rachlinski,
supra note 8, at 129 n.65. "Since the events that [lead to] litigation sometimes predate the settle-
ment talks by years, parties have probably endowed the gains or losses by the time litigation
occurs." Id.
70. See supra note 69.
71. See, e.g., Korobkin & Guthrie, Psychological Barriers, supra note 8, at 130-38; Rachlin-
ski, supra note 8, at 128.
72. Rachlinski, supra note 8, at 144.
73. Id.
74. See supra Part I.A.
75. See, e.g., supra note 45.
76. See Don L. Coursey & Linda R. Stanley, Pretrial Bargaining Behavior Within the
Shadow of the Law: Theory and Experimental Evidence, 8 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 161, 175
(1988) (reporting "theoretical and empirical results" that "depend on the assumption of rational
expectations").
77. See supra Part I.B.
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bust body of empirical evidence.79 Together, the Economic and Fram-
ing Theories illuminate much litigation behavior, but they ultimately
fail to capture its complexity. The collective shortcoming of these the-
ories is that they rest on such a one-dimensional view of human be-
ings. From the perspective of both the Economic and Framing
Theories, litigants are nothing more than calculating creatures. In Star
Trek parlance, the existing theories assume litigants are Vulcans.8 °
Recall the two litigation problems discussed above. In Problem
#3, Plaintiff gets to choose between a certain settlement offer and the
prospect of recovering an even larger amount at trial. In Problem #4,
Defendant must choose between paying a certain settlement amount
to Plaintiff and facing the possibility of an even larger loss at trial. The
Economic and Framing Theories posit that our litigants will choose
solely by making a numerical comparison between the litigation op-
tions (Economic Theory) or between the litigation options and a neu-
tral reference point (Framing Theory). In short, both the Economic
and Framing Theories assume the human beings making litigation de-
cisions are simply number-crunching, value-maximizing, calculating
machines.81 The only difference between them is that the Economic
Theory assumes litigants are good number-crunchers, while the Fram-
ing Theory demonstrates they are not.82
The Economic Theory's limited view of human beings is not sur-
prising, as law and economics scholars often trumpet the simplifying
assumptions of the economic model as among its primary virtues. 83
78. See, e.g., Korobkin & Guthrie, Psychological Barriers, supra note 8; Rachlinski, supra
note 8; Thomas S. Ulen, Still Hazy After All These Years, 22 L. & Soc. INIotJRY 1011, 1031 n.22
(1997).
79. See supra note 71.
80. See, e.g., Harvey R. Greenberg, In Search of Spock: A Psychoanalytic Inquiry, 12 J.
POPULAR FILm & TELEVISION 53, 55 (1984) (noting that Vulcans are "guided by reason alone"
and have suppressed "every affect").
81. While both theories view human beings solely as calculating creatures, their view of the
underlying processes of calculation are different. The Economic Theory "see[s] people as incen-
tive driven, basing their actions on self-interest and rationality," meaning "that people reason
logically about choices, using all available information and allowing for the effects that current
choices will have on future choices and future outcomes." Lopes, Psychology, supra note 42, at
198. The Framing Theory, based on cognitive psychology, "see[s] people as systems for encoding
and processing information." Id. Human beings have "internal processes that intervene as stim-
uli are encoded, interpreted, and finally transmuted into responses." Id.
82. See supra note 71; see also Jules L. Coleman, Rational Choice and Rational Cognition, 3
LEGAL THEORY 183, 184 (1997) ("[E]xperimental cognitive psychologists have raised doubts
about the extent to which typical cognizers are capable of performing even the most basic infer-
ential tasks. In fact, the extent to which humans fail to exhibit inferential competence is striking.
Even if agents seek to maximize their utility, they may fail because their cognitive processes let
them down." (footnote omitted)).
83. See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird, The Future of Law and Economics: Looking Forward, 64
U. CHI. L. REV. 1129, 1131 (1997) ("Economists aim to capture as much of the dynamics of
behavior as they can with the fewest possible assumptions. The question is not whether econo-
mists' assumptions are unrealistic, but whether they capture enough of what is at work to allow
us to see basic forces operating in an otherwise impenetrable maze."); id. at 1135 (quoting Gary
Becker: "[O]ne reason for the great success of Law and Economics is that the principles of
economics are so fundamental, so simple really."); Ellickson, supra note 39, at 23 ("The econo-
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When purporting to characterize litigation decision making on the
part of living, breathing, feeling human beings, however, the Eco-
nomic Theory's limited view of human decision making raises
profound questions about the descriptive value of the theory. "Here,
more than anywhere else," Martha Nussbaum argues, "the founda-
tions of Law and Economics look as yet underdeveloped and crude."84
Indeed, "[w]estern philosophers, ever since Plato and Aristotle, have
agreed that the explanation of human action requires ... the concepts
of belief, desire, perception, appetite, and emotion-at the very
least."85 Because Economic Theorists "do not even bother to sort out
the many different ways in which people ... are moved, how can we
hope to have an adequate descriptive, much less a normative,
theory?"86
While it may come as no surprise that the economics-based litiga-
tion theory rests on a limited view of human beings, it is a little off-
putting to find that the psychology-based litigation theory rests on an
equally limited view. Lola Lopes, a psychologist herself, complains
that "[p]sychologists who study risky choice don't talk about a surpris-
ingly large number of factors that are psychologically relevant in
choosing among risks."87 Hence, factors potentially relevant to litiga-
tion decision making like "fear, hope, safety, danger, fun, plan, con-
flict, time, duty, [and] custom" are nowhere to be found.88 In short,
the psychology-based theory, as well as the economics-based theory,
"fails to capture some of the more human aspects of decision
making.'89
When confronted with difficult litigation decisions, like whether
to settle a case or go forward with trial, litigants will likely number-
crunch, calculate, and value-maximize, as the Economic and Framing
Theories predict, but they will also feel a range of actual and prospec-
mists' model, in its purest form, is based on elegantly simple propositions about both cognitive
capacities and motivations.").
84. Martha C. Nussbaum, Flawed Foundations: The Philosophical Critique of (a Particular
Type of) Economics, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1197, 1210 (1997).
85. Id. at 1209.
86. Id. at 1210.
87. Lopes, Hope, supra note 42, at 286. While Lopes traces the emotionlessness of psychol-
ogy-based decision theories to the influence of behaviorism in psychology, she contends that
economics is also partially responsible: "Queasiness about the ordinary language of emotion and
intention goes back in psychology at least to Watson's behaviorist manifesto and in the area of
risky choice has been amplified by exposure to a similar movement in economics termed positive
economics." Id. For a more expansive psychology-based view of decision making, see TOD
SLOAN, LIFE CHOICES: UNDERSTANDING DILEMMAS AND DECISIONS (1996).
88. Lopes, Hope, supra note 42, at 286; see also Janet Landman, Regret: A Theoretical and
ConceptualAnalysis, 17 J. THEORY SOC. BEHAV. 135, 136 (1987) [hereinafter Landman, Theoret-
ical Analysis] (noting that "cognitive psychologists discourage over-use of vivid, concrete, imagi-
nable, immediate, emotional, and anecdotal information and encourage the use of pallid but
rational statistical or base-rate information in problem-solving and inference").
89. Larrick, Motivational Factors, supra note 6, at 442 (referring to a defect of cardinal
utility theory and prospect theory, though this particular defect applies to expected utility theory
as well).
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tive emotion that they will incorporate into their decision making.
Legal scholars seeking to understand, describe, and perhaps even
modify litigation behavior need not abandon their elegant, "calculat-
ing" theories, but they need to couple them with richer theories that
take the reality-not just the rationality-of human beings into ac-
count. The balance of this article proposes, tests, and examines the
implications of such a theory.
II. THE PROPOSED REGRET AVERSION THEORY
Litigants are human beings who possess not only the ability to
crunch numbers but also the ability to experience emotion. To exclude
all consideration of emotion from a litigation theory is to theorize only
about the calculating component of litigation decision making. To un-
derstand the human process of litigation decision making requires
consideration of both the calculating and emotive components of liti-
gation behavior. The purpose of this part of the article is to put a
human face on litigation by proposing an "emotional" theory9° of liti-
gation behavior to complement the existing "calculating" theories.91
Theorizing generally about the impact of emotion on litigation
behavior is not fruitful, however, for two related reasons. First, "emo-
tion" is not well understood.92 Psychologists disagree about such fun-
damental issues as what emotion is, 93 whether some emotions are
90. While I refer to the theory as "emotional," the psychology literature refers to the type
of theory I am proposing as a "motivational" theory. Motivational theories, according to Richard
Larrick, propose some "psychological mechanism that underlies risk attitudes." Larrick, Motiva-
tional Factors, supra note 6, at 443. These theories "propose that people do not simply respond
to the enjoyment that outcomes provide," Larrick explains, "nor do they simply have a set atti-
tude about risk. Rather, people respond to the emotional consequences of making a decision
that come from self-awareness and a sense of agency: feelings of success and failure, elation and
disappointment, efficacy and impotence, rejoicing and regret." Id. at 443-44. For a general treat-
ment of the instrumental value of emotion, see ROBERT H. FRANK, PASSIONS WITHIN REASON:
THE STRATEGIC ROLE OF THE EMOTIONS (1988).
91. While some scholars have argued that the emotion one litigant feels toward another
might influence litigation behavior, see Peter H. Huang & Ho-Mou Wu, Emotional Responses in
Litigation, 12 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 31, 32 (1992) (arguing that anger, pride, and vengeance one
litigant feels in response to another may influence litigation behavior); Korobkin & Guthrie,
Psychological Barriers, supra note 8, at 147 (arguing that equity seeking might influence litiga-
tion behavior on the part of a litigant who feels wronged by the other party); Mnookin & Korn-
hauser, supra note 3, at 974 (arguing that spite might influence divorce bargaining), this article
proposes the first litigation theory positing that emotion systematically influences litigation be-
havior regardless of the relationship between the litigants or the behavior of one litigant toward
the other. I argue, in other words, that litigants systematically base at least some litigation deci-
sions on emotion evoked not by their adversaries, but by the very structure of the litigation
process itself.
92. "[T]heories of emotion come from many fields of psychology, and these theories start
with different perspectives, make different assumptions, and seek to accomplish different goals.
A global view of research and theory in the field of emotion does not offer a coherent picture."
Robert B. Zajonc, Emotions, in 1 THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 61, at
591, 594.
93. In his comprehensive review of research on emotion published in the latest edition of
The Handbook of Social Psychology, Robert Zajonc refused to define emotion, contending in-
stead that "[a] complete and coherent definition of emotion is equivalent to this entire chapter
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more "basic" than others,94 and sometimes even about the copistructs
that qualify as emotions.95 Second, the purpose of a theory is "to de-
fine events (concepts), describe relationships among these events, and
explain the occurrence of these events."96 To accomplish this purpose,
a theory should be characterized by explanatory power,97 depth,98 fer-
tility,9 9 falsifiability,100 social-technical power," 1 simplicity," 2 and
including the content of its references." Zajonc, supra note 92, at 591. In his book, Ideas and
Realities of Emotion, Brian Parkinson conceded that "no one has been able to come up with a
completely satisfactory answer" to the question posed by William James's classic article, What Is
an Emotion?. BRIAN PARKINSON, IDEAS AND REALITIES OF EMOTION 4 (1995) (referring to
William James, What Is an Emotion?, 9 MIND 188 (1884)). In their review article, Paul and Anne
Kleinginna identified "92 definitions and 9 skeptical statements about the concept of emotion,
drawn mainly from psychological dictionaries and well-known texts on emotion, motivation,
physiological psychology, and introductory psychology." Paul R. Kleinginna, Jr. & Anne M.
Kleinginna, A Categorized List of Emotion Definitions, with Suggestions for a Consensual Defini-
tion, 5 MOTIVATION & EMOTION 345, 347 (1981). Based on their review, Kleinginna and Klein-
ginna did propose the following definition:
Emotion is a complex set of interactions among subjective and objective factors, mediated
by neural/hormonal systems, which can (a) give rise to affective experiences such as feelings
of arousal, pleasure/displeasure; (b) generate cognitive processes such as emotionally rele-
vant perceptual effects, appraisals, labeling processes; (c) activate widespread physiological
adjustments to the arousing conditions; and (d) lead to behavior that is often, but not al-
ways, expressive, goal-directed, and adaptive.
Id. at 355.
94. Some emotion scholars theorize that certain emotions are "basic," while others are
"composites" comprised of those basic emotions. See, e.g., Andrew Ortony & Terence J. Turner,
What's Basic About Basic Emotions?, 97 PSYCHOL. REV. 315, 315 (1990) ("One of the most
ubiquitous notions in the emotion literature is that some emotions have a special status. These
privileged emotions are usually called basic, primary, or fundamental emotions."); Zajonc, supra
note 92, at 593. Although "several contemporary theorists" hold this view, "there is little agree-
ment about how many emotions are basic, which emotions are basic, and why they are basic."
Ortony & Turner, supra, at 315. For a "representative set" of emotion theorists who hold this
view and the emotions they identify as basic, see id. at 315, 316 tbl.1. The basic-emotions view "is
certainly not held by all and is explicitly rejected by some." Id. at 316.
95. See, e.g., PARKINSON, supra note 93, at 10 ("[T]here is less than universal agreement
about what conditions count as emotions. Psychologists as well as laypeople differ in their opin-
ions of whether certain phenomena are or are not emotional."); Ortony & Turner, supra note 94,
at 317.
96. JOHN J. SHAUGHNESSY & EUGENE B. ZECHMEISTER, RESEARCH METHODS IN PSY-
CHOLOGY 29 (3d ed. 1994).
97. See Nancy Levit, Listening to Tribal Legends: An Essay on Law and the Scientific
Method, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 263, 269 (1989) [hereinafter Levit, Scientific Method] ("A theory
must possess sufficient explanatory force: it must accurately explain the phenomena under
study."); see also Nancy Levit, Defining Cutting Edge Scholarship: Feminism and Criteria of Ra-
tionality, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 947, 953 (1996) [hereinafter Levit, Defining].
98. See Levit, Scientific Method, supra note 97, at 269 ("Closely aligned with explanatory
power is the concept of depth. A deep thesis goes beyond merely stating or describing phenom-
ena. It explains possible causal relationships among observable phenomena, arranges isolated
events into general patterns and seeks underlying explanations."); see also Levit, Defining, supra
note 97, at 953.
99. See Levit, Defining, supra note 97, at 953-54 ("A theory is fertile, or possesses explora-
tory power, if it gives rise to and searches for new relations and interdependencies."); see also
Levit, Scientific Method, supra note 97, at 270.
100. See Levit, Defining, supra note 97, at 954 (noting that "[t]heories must be capable of
verification and falsification"); see also Levit, Scientific Method, supra note 97, at 271. Levit
states:
Theories must be testable and refutable. If theories are non-falsifiable, they are unscientific.
Hypotheses that avoid testability-for example, those concerning the existence of supernat-
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"cumulative, comprehensive, and converging evidence."1 3 Given the
confused state of our knowledge of emotion 1°4 and the plethora of
constructs most of us recognize as emotions, it would be impossible to
propose a general "emotion" theory meeting the aforementioned cri-
teria to any satisfactory degree.
Fortunately, however, it is possible to put a human face on litiga-
tion by developing a theory based solely on the impact of one particu-
larly potent and universa °10 5 emotion-regret. This part of the article
thus develops the theory that litigants seek to make litigation deci-
sions that minimize the likelihood they will experience postdecision
regret. To develop this theory, I explain below what regret is, examine
how decision theorists have employed the concept of regret, and pro-
pose the Regret Aversion Theory of Litigation Behavior, which I then
test in the next part of the article.
ural beings-are not scientific. Likewise, theories that purport to explain everything, theo-
ries that are unconditional and admit no negative evidence and theories that are vague or
otherwise self-protected are not falsifiable.
Id.; see also Jonathan R. Macey, Law and the Social Sciences, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 171,
172 (1997) ("The most important and fundamental distinction [between law and social sciences
and other approaches to law] is that the law and social sciences seek to develop testable hypoth-
eses, assertions about the law that are empirically refutable.").
101. See Levit, Defining, supra note 97, at 954 ("The social-technical power of a theory
refers to its ability to prevent, modify, invent, start, stop, interconnect, and transform. It is the
practical, applicatory end of scientific and rational procedures.").
102. See id. (noting that "simplicity or elegance refers to a theory being distinguished as
systematically unified and unifying, one which brings together the general and the particular, and
which is largely devoid of special circumstances"); see also Levit, Scientific Method, supra note
97, at 268-69.
103. Levit, Defining, supra note 97, at 953 ("Cumulative, comprehensive, and converging
evidence means evidence gathered over time, in variable contexts (including different disciplines
and sub-disciplines) .... ").
104. See supra notes 92-95 and accompanying text.
105. Regret is an inescapable part of the human condition, see, e.g., infra notes 106-08 and
accompanying text, but culture clearly plays a role in the experience of regret. See Blaine B.
Alexander et al., A Path Not Taken: A Cultural Analysis of Regrets and Childlessness in the Lives
of Older Women, 32 GERONTOLOGIST 618, 619 (1992) ("[B]ecause the social is not dichoto-
mously distinct from the personal, regrets are not restricted to the terrain of the individual but
are situated in a cultural context.").
Because our culture provides us with what appear to be nearly unlimited opportunities to
make good and bad choices, we are particularly susceptible to feelings of regret. See, e.g., CAR-
OLE KLEIN & RICHARD GoTII, OVERCOMING REGRET: LESSONS FROM THE ROADS NOT TAKEN
10 (1992). They state:
Contemporary society intensifies regret because it claims to present us with apparently infi-
nite opportunities. While having so many choices might at first appear to diminish the di-
lemma of regret-after all, we have so many routes to happiness from which to select-it
has just the opposite effect. Regret, which is inextricably linked to choice, has become a ma-
jor malady of modern life.
Id.; see also, e.g., Mary Kay DeGenova, Regrets in Later Life, 8 J. WOMEN & ACING 75, 76
(1996) ("With the various options of life choices in the American culture, there also is enormous
room for regret. Ultimately, the culture in the United States provides great opportunity for
choosing paths and regretting paths not taken.").
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A. Regret, Anticipated Regret, and Regret Aversion
"We all know regret"'10 6 because "[a] lifetime of making choices
brings with it the knowledge that at least some actions were ill-consid-
ered, some failures to act unwise. For most of us, it also brings with it
the realization that some of these unfortunate outcomes could have
been avoided. To live, it seems, is to accumulate at least some
regrets. ,1 0 7
We may, in fact, "all know regret,"'0 8 but what is it that we know
when we know regret? What, in other words, is the seemingly univer-
sal phenomenon we call regret? Philosophers, 0 9 economists," 0 psy-
chologists, 1 ' and psychotherapists 1 2 have proposed a variety of
definitions. While there are subtle and not-so-subtle distinctions
among these definitions, 1 3 most scholars define regret as the painful
106. Rudiger Bittner, Is It Reasonable to Regret Things One Did?, 89 J. PHIL. 262, 262
(1992).
107. Thomas Gilovich & Victoria Husted Medvec, The Experience of Regret: What, When,
and Why, 102 PSYCHOL. REV. 379, 379 (1995) [hereinafter Gilovich & Medvec, Experience of
Regret]; see also Daniel Matthew Gordon, 'The Road Not Taken': A Phenomenological Investi-
gation of the Experience of Regret 1 (1992) (unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Ten-
nessee, Knoxville) ("The human experience of regret is an exceedingly common occurrence.");
Susan B. Shimanoff, Commonly Named Emotions in Everyday Conversations, 58 PERCEPTUAL &
MOTOR SKILLS 514, 514 (1984) (finding in an analysis of the everyday conversations of college
students and married couples that regret was the second most frequently mentioned emotion).
108. Bittner, supra note 106, at 262.
109. See STUART HAMPSHIRE, THUorr AND ACTION 241 (1960) (defining regret as "a feel-
ing of unpleasure associated with a thought of the past, together with the identification of an
object and the announcement of an inclination to behave in a certain way in the future"); Amelie
Oksenberg Rorty, Agent Regret, in EXPLAINING EMOTIONS 489, 497 (Amelie Oksenberg Rorty
ed., 1980) ("To qualify as a feeling of regret, the feeling must have certain sorts of intentional
objects, be accompanied by certain sorts of thoughts.... The feeling must be associated with a
causal story that connects it to its proper intentional object, in order to qualify as regret.").
110. See, e.g., David E. Bell, Reply: Putting a Premium on Regret, 31 MGMT. SCd. 117, 117
(1985) [hereinafter Bell, Reply] ("Regret is created by a comparison between the actual outcome
and that outcome that would have occurred had the decision maker made a different choice.");
Graham Loomes, Further Evidence of the Impact of Regret and Disappointment in Choice Under
Uncertainty, 55 ECONOMICA 47, 50 (1988) [hereinafter Loomes, Further Evidence] (arguing that
"regret/rejoicing is based on comparisons between what is received as a result of choosing one
action compared with what might have been received under the same state of the world had the
individual chosen differently"); Robert Sugden, Regret, Recrimination and Rationality, 19 THE-
ORY & DECISION 77, 78-79 (1985) [hereinafter Sugden, Regret, Recrimination and Rationality].
111. See, e.g., LANDMAN, supra note 28, at 36 (defining regret as "a more or less painful
judgment and state of feeling sorry for misfortunes, limitations, losses, shortcomings, transgres-
sions, or mistakes"); Gordon, supra note 107, at 124-28.
112. See, e.g., George Greenberg & Mary FitzPatrick, Regret as an Essential Ingredient in
Psychotherapy, 5 PSYCHOTHERAPY PATIENT 35, 35 (1988).
113. There is some disagreement among scholars about whether a person must bear some
responsibility for the action or decision "regretted" in order to claim feelings of regret. In other
words, scholars disagree about whether regret requires "decision responsibility." Terry Connolly
et al., Regret and Responsibility in the Evaluation of Decision Outcomes, 70 ORGANIZATIONAL
BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 73, 75 (1997).
Janet Landman proposes the "broadest, most inclusive" conception of regret, see id., defin-
ing it, as noted above, as "a more or less painful judgment and state of feeling sorry for misfor-
tunes, limitations, losses, shortcomings, transgressions, or mistakes." LANDMAN, supra note 28,
at 4. Landman thus believes that one can regret actions or inactions for which one bears no or
minimal responsibility. "By Landman's definition, one might experience regret at the loss of
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feeling a person experiences upon determining she could have ob-
tained a better outcome if she had decided or behaved differently.'
1 4
Psychotherapists George Greenberg and Mary FitzPatrick, for in-
stance, define regret as "the unpleasant feeling associated with some
action or inaction a person has taken which has led to a state of affairs
that he or she wishes were different." '115 Similarly, the economist Rob-
ert Sugden contends that regret is comprised of "the simple wish that
you had chosen differently" coupled with a feeling of "self-recrimina-
tion or repentance or self-blame."' 16 And the psychologist Daniel
Gordon explains that "[t]he experience of regret is a painful one in
which the individual dwells on the circumstances of the decision-the
consequences and missed opportunities-and his or her role in the
decision, wishing he or she had done otherwise and feeling he or she
should have done otherwise."' 17 Indeed, the very "essence of the ex-
one's wallet or one's temper, at being too short to play competitive basketball, or at catching the
flu." Connolly et al., supra, at 73. Others appear to share Landman's view that regret does not
require responsibility on the part of the individual experiencing the regret. See id.; Itamar Si-
monson, The Influence of Anticipating Regret and Responsibility on Purchase Decisions, 19 J.
CONSUMER RES. 105, 117 (1992) (arguing that "regret and responsibility should be regarded as
separate constructs" because "[riegret represents the sorrow over something done or not done,
regardless of whether the decision maker was responsible for the outcome").
Most scholars, however, assume that regret includes some notion of decision responsibility
on the part of the party experiencing regret. See, e.g., Marcel Zeelenberg et al., The Experience
of Regret and Disappointment, 12 COGNITION & EMOTION 221, 228 (1998) [hereinafter
Zeelenberg et al., Experience]; Marcel Zeelenberg et al., Reconsidering the Relation Between
Regret and Responsibility, 74 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 254, 267
(1998) (conducting research showing the "clear effects of responsibility on regret"); Daniel M.
Farrell, Book Review, 47 PHIL. Q. 397 (1997). I, too, believe that regret necessarily includes
decision responsibility. Like philosopher Daniel Farrell, I believe that Landman's conception of
regret is misguided because "all we can properly regret are our own past actions and decisions;
the other 'regrettable' things she mentions, one might say, are, strictly speaking, things whose
occurrence we might lament, perhaps, or otherwise wish had not occurred, but not things we can
intelligibly be said to regret in the same sense as that in which we can be said to regret things we
have intentionally done." Farrell, supra, at 399.
Interestingly, the philosopher Bernard Williams sidesteps the entire debate by distinguish-
ing between "general regret" (in which "what are regretted are states of affairs, and they can be
regretted, in principle, by anyone who knows of them") and "agent-regret" ("which a person can
feel only towards his own past actions"). Bernard Williams, Moral Luck, in MORAL LUCK: PHIL-
OSOPHICAL PAPERS 1973-1980, at 20, 27 (Bernard Williams ed., 1981). For Williams, in other
words, general regret does not require decision responsibility, but agent-regret does.
114. This definition of regret, like most, assumes that regret is comprised of both affective
and cognitive components. See generally Gilovich & Medvec, Experience of Regret, supra note
107, at 379. They state:
[T]here is general consensus that regret is an unusually cognitively-laden or cognitively-
determined emotion.... Judgment is more central, in other words, to the experience of
regret than, say, the experience of jealousy or anger. At the same time, regret is more than a
simple appraisal or judgment; it is typically loaded with feeling and therefore qualifies as a
true emotion.
Id. Regret, in short, "is an experience of felt-reason or reasoned-emotion." LANDMAN, supra
note 28, at 36.
115. Greenberg & FitzPatrick, supra note 112, at 35.
116. Sugden, Regret, Recrimination and Rationality, supra note 110, at 78-79.
117. Gordon, supra note 107, at 115. Gordon developed his conception of regret through in-
depth "dialogical interviews" with 12 study participants describing their actual experiences of
regret. See id. at v.
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perience of regret is one of looking back and blaming oneself for a
bad decision., 118
Because people regularly look back and blame themselves for de-
cisions they wish they had made differently, they have learned to an-
ticipate the regret they may feel if a decision turns out poorly. This
anticipation is a potent force. 1 9 Philosophers and economists have
long noted that "anticipation of the future has an impact on immedi-
ate well-being." ' It "seems self-evident," in fact, "that much of our
feelings of well-being and despair arise from emotions associated with
anticipation.' 12 1 Because regret is a painful emotion-because people
in the throes of regret feel "a sinking feeling,"'21 2 think "about a lost
opportunity and a mistake they ha[ve] made,' 11 3 and feel like "'kick-
ing themselves'" 24-they seek to make decisions that will minimize
the regret they anticipate feeling. In other words, people tend to make
regret-minimizing or regret-averse decisions.
B. Regret and Decision Theory
Building on the intuition that people both anticipate and seek to
avoid postdecision regret, decision theorists have attempted to con-
struct regret-based decision theories. While such attempts have been
characterized by small fits and starts dating back as far as the 1950s, 125
118. Id. at 115.
119. Psychologists have found, for example, that the anticipation of a panic attack has more
influence than an actual panic attack on the avoidance behavior of agoraphobics. See generally
Dianne L. Chambless & Edward J. Gracely, Fear of Fear and the Anxiety Disorders, 13 COGNI-
TIVE THERAPY & RES. 9 (1989); Brian J. Cox et al., Anticipatory Anxiety and Avoidance in Panic
Disorder with Agoraphobia, 29 BEHAVIORAL RES. THERAPY 363, 364 (1991); Michelle G. Craske
& David H. Barlow, A Review of the Relationship Between Panic and Avoidance, 8 CLINICAL
PSYCHOL. REV. 667, 668 (1988).
120. George Loewenstein, Anticipation and the Valuation of Delayed Consumption, 97
ECON. J. 666, 666 (1987) (tracing this observation to Jeremy Bentham).
121. Id. at 679-80.
122. Ira J. Roseman et al., Phenomenology, Behaviors, and Goals Differentiate Discrete
Emotions, 67 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 206, 213-14 (1994).
123. Id.
124. Id.; see Zeelenberg et al., Experience, supra note 113, at 227 (finding that the experi-
ence of regret "involves feeling more intensely that one should have known better, thinking
about what a mistake one has made, feeling a tendency to kick oneself and to correct one's
mistake, and wanting to undo the event and to get a second chance").
125. Conventional wisdom holds that regret is an "underresearched emotion," see Roseman
et al., supra note 122, at 219, that "has only recently been the subject of empirical scrutiny."
Kenneth Savitsky et al., Remembering and Regretting: The Zeigarnik Effect and the Cognitive
Availability of Regrettable Actions and Inactions, 23 PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. BULL. 248,
248 (1997); see also Farrell, supra note 113, at 397 (noting in his review of Janet Landman's book
that "apart from a few extremely interesting philosophical pieces, and a small number of empiri-
cal studies, there has, as Landman notes, been surprisingly little serious work published on re-
gret" in the recent past).
Conventional wisdom notwithstanding, decision theorists attempted as long ago as the 1950s
to factor regret into decision-making models. Leonard Savage, for instance, proposed a
"minimax regret" principle, according to which decision makers seek to minimize their maxi-
mum loss. See SAVAGE, supra note 30, at 163-71. The minimax regret principle suffered from
formal and empirical problems. See LANDMAN, supra note 28, at 149. But see Apocalypse Maybe,
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a trio of decision theorists-Graham Loomes and Robert Sugden in
one article 126 and David Bell in another127-successfully promulgated
"modern regret theory" 121 in the early 1980s. 129
ECONOMIST, Mar. 30, 1996, at 74 (advocating the use of the minimax regret principle to aid
Great Britain in addressing the country's response to its mad cow disease problem). Duncan
Luce and Howard Raiffa tried to incorporate regret into normative expected utility theory, see
R. DUNCAN LUCE & HOWARD RAIFFA, GAMES AND DECISIONS: INTRODUCTION AND CRITICAL
SURVEY 280 (1957), but they determined "its use had undesirable properties, such as intransitiv-
ity." David E. Bell, Regret in Decision Making Under Uncertainty, 30 OPERATIONS RES. 961, 962-
63 (1982) [hereinafter Bell, Regret in Decision Making].
Following this early and relatively unsuccessful flurry of activity in the 1950s, scholars
largely ignored the empirical study of regret until the 1980s. But see LEON FESTINGER, CON-
FLICT, DECISION, AND DISSONANCE 97-112 (1964) (examining the role of regret in cognitive dis-
sonance theory); IRVING I. JANIS & LEON MANN, DECISION MAKING: A PSYCHOLOGICAL
ANALYSIS OF CONFLICT, CHOICE, AND COMMITMENT 219-42 (1977) (examining the impact of
"arousal of anticipatory regret" on decision making); WAYNE LEE, DECISION THEORY AND
HUMAN BEHAVIOR 38-39, 126-31 (1971) (exploring the minimax regret principle); Max S.
Schoeffler, Prediction of Some Stochastic Events: A Regret Equalization Model, 64 J. EXPERI-
MENTAL PSYCHOL. 615, 615 (1962) (proposing a "regret equalization model").
"Beginning in the 1980s, however, there has been a growing interest in the study of regret
within the quantitative social sciences." Janet Landman, Regret and Elation Following Action
and Inaction: Affective Responses to Positive Versus Negative Outcomes, 13 PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. BULL. 524, 524 (1987) [hereinafter Landman, Regret and Elation].
126. Graham Loomes & Robert Sugden, Regret Theory: An Alternative Theory of Rational
Choice Under Uncertainty, 92 ECON. J. 805 (1982) [hereinafter Loomes & Sugden, Regret The-
ory]. For additional work by Loomes and/or Sugden on regret theory, see generally Loomes,
Further Evidence, supra note 110; Graham Loomes, When Actions Speak Louder Than Pros-
pects, 78 AM. ECON. REV. 463 (1988); Graham Loomes et al., Are Preferences Monotonic? Test-
ing Some Predictions of Regret Theory, 59 ECONOMICA 17 (1992); Graham Loomes & Robert
Sugden, A Rationale for Preference Reversal, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 428 (1983) [hereinafter
Loomes & Sugden, Rationale]; Graham Loomes & Robert Sugden, Regret Theory and Informa-
tion: A Reply, 94 ECON. J. 649 (1984); Graham Loomes & Robert Sugden, Some Implications of
a More General Form of Regret Theory, 41 J. ECON. THEORY 270 (1987) [hereinafter Loomes &
Sugden, Implications]; Sugden, Regret, Recrimination and Rationality, supra note 110.
127. Bell, Regret in Decision Making, supra note 125, at 961. For additional work by Bell on
regret theory, see generally Bell, Reply, supra note 110; David E. Bell, Risk Premiums for Deci-
sion Regret, 29 MGMTr. ScI. 1156 (1983) [hereinafter Bell, Risk Premiums]. In addition to his
work on regret, Bell has also developed a decision theory based on "disappointment," which he
defines as "a psychological reaction to an outcome that does not match up to expectations."
David E. Bell, Disappointment in Decision Making Under Uncertainty, 33 OPERATIONS RES. 1, 1
(1985).
128. I will use the terms "regret theory" and "modern regret theory" to refer to both the
Loomes and Sugden and Bell versions of the theory, even though there are some differences
between them.
129. For formal work on regret theory conducted by scholars other than Bell, Loomes, and
Sugden, see, for example, Daniela Di Cagno & John D. Hey, A Direct Test of the Original Ver-
sion of Regret Theory, 1 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 43, 56 (1988) (finding in part that "the
original form of Regret Theory appears too restrictive" to explain their experimental evidence);
David W. Harless, Actions Versus Prospects: The Effect of Problem Representation on Regret, 82
AM. ECON. REV. 634, 646-47 (1992) (finding that the presentation of choice problem affects
elicitation of regret); Steven J. Humphrey, Regret Aversion or Event-Splitting Effects? More Evi-
dence Under Risk and Uncertainty, 11 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 263, 272 (1995) (finding that
"regret theory contains significantly less power than was previously thought"); Jonathan W. Le-
land, Generalized Similarity Judgments: An Alternative Explanation for Choice Anomalies, 9 J.
RISK & UNCERTAINTY 151, 156-63 (1994) (finding support for and against regret theory); An-
drew P. Sage & Elbert B. White, Decision and Information Structures in Regret Models of Judg-
ment and Choice, in SMC-13 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SYSTEMS, MAN, AND CYBERNETICS 136,
144 (1990) (attesting to the descriptive value of regret theory); Chris Starmer, Testing New Theo-
ries of Choice Under Uncertainty Using the Common Consequence Effect, 59 REV. ECON. STUD.
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Modern regret theory "posits two assumptions about the role that
regret plays in making decisions under risk."13 First, following a deci-
sion, "people compare what they have received with what they would
have received had they made a different choice. If a different choice
would have led to a better outcome, then people will feel regret about
their decisions ... 131 Second, "[b]ecause people know that they ex-
perience these feelings after a decision, they take them into account
while they are making a decision and try to make choices that mini-
mize the amount of regret they will feel."' 3 2
Regret theory assumes, then, that the value of a decision option is
a function not only of its outcome but also of the feelings associated
with the outcomes of foregone options. 133 As a consequence, "the
813, 826-28 (1992) (finding some evidence supporting regret theory). See generally Kevin Kea-
sey, Regret Theory and Information: A Note, 94 ECON. J. 645 (1984) (applying regret theory to
information analysis and questioning whether it is a rational theory of choice).
130. Richard P. Larrick & Terry L. Boles, Avoiding Regret in Decisions with Feedback: A
Negotiation Example, 63 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 87, 87
(1995).
131. Id. See also Bell, Reply, supra note 110, at 117 ("Regret is created by a comparison
between the actual outcome and that outcome that would have occurred had the decision maker
made a different choice."), and Loomes & Sugden, Rationale, supra note 126, at 428, who argue:
The essential notion underlying regret theory is that people tend to compare their actual
situations with the ones they would have been in, had they made different choices in the
past. If they realize that a different choice would have led to a better outcome, people may
experience the painful sensation of regret ....
The proponents of modern regret theory recognize that decision makers may also experi-
ence the opposite of regret-rejoicing-if they obtain a decision outcome better than the fore-
gone option. See Bell, Regret in Decision Making, supra note 125, at 963 (allowing that regret
can have both positive and negative values); Loomes & Sugden, Regret Theory, supra note 126,
at 809 (defining a "regret-rejoice function"); Sugden, Regret, Recrimination and Rationality,
supra note 110, at 77 (recognizing the phenomenon of decision rejoicing).
During the decision process, however, "the possibility of rejoicing will not be attractive
enough to offset the possibility of regret" for a number of reasons. Larrick & Boles, supra note
130, at 89. First, a robust body of research demonstrates that individual judgment is influenced
more by negative information than by positive information. See, e.g., Shelley E. Taylor, Asym-
metrical Effects of Positive and Negative Events: The Mobilization-Minimization Hypothesis, 110
PSYCHOL. BULL. 67, 69-70 (1991). Second, losses are more aversive than gains are attractive. See,
e.g., supra note 64. Third, and more directly relevant, research shows that "the satisfaction asso-
ciated with receiving an outcome that is better than an alternative is not as great as the dissatis-
faction associated with receiving an outcome that is worse." Larrick & Boles, supra note 130, at
89.
132. Robert A. Josephs et al., Protecting the Self from the Negative Consequences of Risky
Decisions, 62 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 26, 26-27 (1992); see also Loomes & Sugden,
Rationale, supra note 126, at 428 ("When faced with new choice situations, people remember
their previous experiences and form expectations about the rejoicing and regret that the present
alternatives might entail. They then take these expectations into account when making their
decisions."); Marcel Zeelenberg & Jane Beattie, Consequences of Regret Aversion 2: Additional
Evidence for Effects of Feedback on Decision Making, 72 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM.
DECISION PROCESSES 63, 72-75 (1997) (demonstrating that the experience of regret influences
subsequent decision making).
133. See, e.g., Larrick & Boles, supra note 130, at 87 n.1 ("Both versions of regret theory
assume that the value of a given option is a function not only of its outcomes but also of how its
outcomes compare to the outcomes of possible alternatives. This assumption differs from the
standard assumption in alternative-based models of decision making, such as expected utility
theory, that only the outcomes of a given option determine its value. Prospect theory also makes
this assumption, although the initial editing of prospects may be affected by comparison between
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most important determinant of regret is the presence or absence of
feedback on foregone alternatives." '134 This seems intuitive for "[i]f
feedback is expected on the outcome of a foregone alternative, deci-
sion makers know they might learn that a foregone alternative led to a
better result than the alternative they chose." '135 On the other hand,
"if no feedback is expected, decision makers know they are protected
from experiencing the regret of learning that another alternative
turned out better." '136 Thus, modern regret theory predicts that regret
aversion will be greater "when decision makers expect to learn the
outcome of the foregone alternative" than "when the outcome of the
foregone alternative will forever remain a mystery. '7137 Proponents of
regret theory recognize, of course, that decision makers may experi-
ence regret even where the outcomes of foregone alternatives remain
unrevealed,' 38 but they contend, nonetheless, that "the regret stem-
ming from comparisons with imagined outcomes is less painful than
regret stemming from comparisons with real foregone outcomes. 1 39
Scholars from several disciplines using a wide array of methodol-
ogies have demonstrated that decision makers make regret-averse de-
cisions in a variety of contexts. Empirical evidence demonstrates, for
alternatives." (citations omitted)); Loomes et al., supra note 126, at 18 ("The central intuition
behind regret theory is that the utility derived from the consequence of a choice is dependent
upon the outcome(s) of the alternative(s) foregone, given the state of the world that occurs.");
Marcel Zeelenberg et al., Consequences of Regret Aversion: Effects of Expected Feedback on
Risky Decision Making, 65 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 148, 148
(1996) [hereinafter Zeelenberg et al., Consequences] (noting that "the utility of a choice option
additionally depends on the feelings evoked by the outcomes of rejected options").
134. Larrick, Motivational Factors, supra note 6, at 445; see also Bell, Risk Premiums, supra
note 127, at 1165 (arguing that the "[k]ey to the identification of regret as a factor in decision
making under uncertainty is the hypothesis that it may matter whether a foregone lottery is
resolved or not").
135. Larrick & Boles, supra note 130, at 88.
136. Id.
137. Id.; see also Zeelenberg et al., Consequences, supra note 133, at 149 ("Resolution of
both the chosen and the unchosen option(s) is central to regret theory: if you cannot compare
what is with what would have been, there should be no reason for regret.").
138. Decision makers may, for example, experience regret because they compare their deci-
sion outcomes to better "imagined alternative outcomes." David S. Boninger et al., Counterfac-
tual Thinking: From What Might Have Been to What May Be, 67 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 297, 297 (1994) (emphasis added). Decision makers may, in other words, experience
regret because they engage in "counterfactual thinking." See generally WHAT MIGHT HAVE
BEEN: THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF COUNTERFACTUAL THINKING (Neal J. Roese & James M.
Olson eds., 1995); Robert N. Strassfeld, If...: Counterfactuals in the Law, 60 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 339 (1992). For a broader conception of counterfactual thinking, see Marcel Zeelenberg et
al., Emotional Reactions to the Outcomes of Decisions: The Role of Counterfactual Thought in the
Experience of Regret and Disappointment, 75 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION
PROCESSES 117, 118 (1998) (defining counterfactual thinking to include "thoughts in which cur-
rent reality is changed into what might, could, would, or should have been").
139. Zeelenberg et al., Consequences, supra note 133, at 149 n.2; see also Ilana Ritov,
Probability of Regret: Anticipation of Uncertainty Resolution in Choice, 66 ORGANIZATIONAL
BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 228, 236 (1996) (arguing that "regret is less intense when
the foregone outcome is hypothetical"); Marcel Zeelenberg & Eric van Dijk, A Reverse Sunk
Cost Effect in Risky Decision Making: Sometimes We Have Too Much Invested to Gamble, 18 J.
ECON. PSYCHOL. 677, 683 (1997).
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example, that anticipated regret influences consumer purchase deci-
sions,14° driving behavior,'41 adolescent sexual behavior,142 grain pro-
ducers' selling decisions, 43 negotiation behavior,144 medical decision
making on the part of doctors145 and patients, 46 investor prefer-
140. See J. Jeffrey Inman & Leigh McAlister, Do Coupon Expiration Dates Affect Consumer
Behavior?, 31 J. MARKETING RES. 423 (1994) (finding, based on a review of coupon redemption
patterns, that anticipated regret may account for the increase in consumer coupon redemption
behavior prior to coupon expiration dates); Simonson, supra note 113, at 106-07 (finding that
anticipated regret can influence consumer purchasing decisions regarding purchase timing and
brand choice); see also Richard H. Thaler, Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice, in
QUASI-RATIONAL ECONOMICS, supra note 33, at 3, 15 (arguing that the prospect of regret in-
duces consumers to "choos[e] not to choose").
141. See Dianne Parker et al., Extending the Theory of Planned Behaviour: The Role of
Personal Norm, 34 BRIT. J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 127, 134 (1995) (finding that "the more respondents
anticipated feeling regret should they commit a driving violation, the less likely they were to
report intentions to do so"); Dianne Parker et al., Modifying Beliefs and Attitudes to Exceeding
the Speed Limit: An Intervention Study Based on the Theory of Planned Behavior, 26 J. APPLIED
SOC. PSYCHOL. 1. 14 (1996) (finding that viewers of an "anticipated-regret video" reported more
negative attitudes toward speeding).
142. See generally Ren6 Richard et al., Anticipated Affective Reactions and Prevention of
AIDS, 34 BRIT. J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 9 (1995) (finding generally that anticipated regret may pro-
mote safe sex practices on the part of adolescents); Ren6 Richard & Joop van der Pligt, Factors
Affecting Condom Use Among Adolescents, 1 J. COrMuMUNITY & APP. Soc. PSYCHOL. 105 (1991)
(finding that anticipated regret was an important predictor of condom use for adolescent boys);
Rend Richard et al., Anticipated Regret and Time Perspective: Changing Sexual Risk-taking Be-
havior, 9 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 185, 196 (1996) (finding that anticipated regret can have
a similar effect on the safe sex practices of adults); Joop van der Pligt & Ren6 Richard, Changing
Adolescents' Sexual Behavior: Perceived Risk, Self-Efficacy and Anticipated Regret, 23 PATIENT
EDUC. & COUNSELING 187 (1993) (reviewing research on this topic).
143. See BONNIE LEONHARDT LINDEMANN, THE EFFECTS OF SOCIAL CONTEXT ON GRAIN
PRODUCERS' DECISIONS TO HOLD OR TO SELL GRAIN 121 (1993) (Ph.D. thesis, University of
Iowa) ("Despite the advice of marketing analysts, producers are affected by regret and elation.
Their feelings are altered, and the future strategies they select are changed by the other out-
comes they forgo.").
144. In an employment negotiation exercise, Larrick and Boles found that their results
"demonstrated that differences in what subjects expected to learn about their foregone alterna-
tives significantly affected their choices." Larrick & Boles, supra note 130, at 94. "When coming
to agreement would shield them from learning the specific value of their BATNA [i.e., "best
alternative to a negotiated agreement"], subjects were less demanding, more likely to reach
agreement, and frequently settled for less than their initial reservation price." Id. But "[w]hen
coming to agreement would not shield them from learning the specific value of their BATNA,
subjects were more demanding, were more likely to reach impasse, and rarely settled for less
than their reservation price." Id. In short, Larrick and Boles concluded, "[t]he current findings
provide a measure of the degree to which people are regret averse." Id.; see also Russell
Korobkin, Inertia and Preference in Contract Negotiations: The Psychological Power of Default
Rules and Form Terms, 51 VAND. L. REv. 1583 (1998) (providing experimental data showing
that anticipated regret may explain negotiators' preference for default terms in contract negotia-
tions); Zeelenberg & Beattie, supra note 132, at 67-75 (finding that anticipated regret influenced
subjects' negotiating behavior in the ultimatum game).
145. Dr. Alvan R. Feinstein, for instance, observes that doctors do not make clinical deci-
sions consistent with expected utility theory. Rather, doctors make decisions consistent with re-
gret theory. See Alvan R. Feinstein, The 'Chagrin Factor' and Qualitative Decision Analysis, 145
ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1257, 1257 (1985) ("Since the relative magnitudes of chagrin will
differ for different types of wrong results, a customary clinical strategy is to choose the option
whose wrong result will cause the least chagrin."); see also Christopher C. Colenda et al., Antici-
pated Regret Associated with Treatment Decisions for Agitated Dementia Patients, 3 AM. J. GERI-
ATRIC PSYCHIATRY 68, 72-74 (1995) (finding in hypothetical vignettes that anticipated regret
influenced treatment of agitated dementia patients); Stephen D. Nightingale, Risk Preference
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ences,147 corporate dividend policy, 148 and gambling behavior. 149 As
yet, however, no one has examined whether anticipated regret influ-
ences litigation behavior.
C. Regret and Litigation Behavior
Building on modern regret theory, I propose in this article the
Regret Aversion Theory of Litigation Behavior. This theory posits
that litigants seek to make litigation decisions that minimize the likeli-
hood they will experience postlitigation regret. In our litigation sys-
tem, litigants generally must choose between settling and trying their
cases. Litigants who settle never learn what they would have recov-
ered at trial, but litigants who reject settlement offers in favor of trial
learn the outcomes of both options. Settlement, thus, offers litigants
and Admitting Rates of Emergency Room Physicians, 26 MED. CARE 84, 87 (1988) (hypothesiz-
ing regret aversion as an explanation for hospital admission rates); Cheryl B. Travis et al., Judg-
ment Heuristics and Medical Decisions, 13 PATIENT EnUC. & COUNSELING 211, 215 (1989)
(proposing regret theory as one possible explanation for clinical treatment decisions).
146. See Tjeerd Tymstra, The Imperative Character of Medical Technology and the Meaning
of 'Anticipated Decision, Regret', 5 INT'L J. TECH. ASSESSMENT HEALTH CARE 207, 210, 211
(1989) (arguing that medical patients feel compelled to try new medical technologies due to
regret they anticipate feeling if they do not try them and demonstrating in a survey of in vitro
fertilization patients that "[pireventing feelings of regret appears to be a motive for undergoing
IVF").
147. See Donald C. Langevoort, Selling Hope, Selling Risk: Some Lessons for Law from
Behavioral Economics About Stockbrokers and Sophisticated Customers, 84 CAL. L. REv. 627,
652-53 (1996) (proposing anticipatory regret as an explanation for investor behavior); Hersh M.
Shefrin & Meir Statman, Explaining Investor Preference for Cash Dividends, 13 J. FIN. ECON.
253, 268, 280 (1984) (proposing regret aversion as one explanation for investor preference for
dividends over capital gains).
148. See generally Chinmoy Ghosh, A Regret-Theoretic Explanation of Corporate Dividend
Policy, 20 J. Bus. FIN. & Accr. 559 (1993) (finding that financial managers make corporate
dividend policy decisions consistent with the predictions of regret theory).
149. Zeelenberg et al., for instance, gave subjects a choice between a safe gamble and a risky
gamble in three simple gambling problems. They also varied the information they provided to
subjects about whether the subjects would learn the outcomes of foregone options. See
Zeelenberg et al., Consequences, supra note 133, at 151-56. They found that "[p]articipants who
expected to receive feedback on the safe option, regardless of their choice, were likely to choose
this option, thereby protecting themselves from threatening feedback on the foregone outcome.
Likewise, participants who expected to receive feedback on the risky option tended to choose
the risky option." Id. at 156. They found, in other words, that "the anticipation of regret, caused
by the manipulation of expected feedback on foregone options, can promote risk-averse and
risk-seeking choices," prompting them to conclude that "people are regret averse, i.e., make
choices to minimize their possible future regret. These choices can be relatively risk-seeking or
relatively risk-avoiding." Id.; see also Maya Bar-Hillel & Efrat Neter, Why Are People Reluctant
to Exchange Lottery Tickets?, 70 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 17, 26 (1996). They demon-
strate that subjects are reluctant to relinquish lottery tickets with identical probabilities and also
argue:
[T]he mere fact that two lottery tickets have the potential to result in different outcomes,
and in particular, one can result in a desired outcome while the other results in a less desired
outcome, suffices to induce an anticipation of regret (which is larger for an exchange than
for its refusal). It is not necessary that this potential for having ex post different values
actually be realized, far less known [sic]. It is enough that it exists.
Id.; see also Josephs et al., supra note 132, at 35 (finding generally that regret aversion affects
choice behavior, particularly for those with low self-esteem); Ritov, supra note 139, at 236 (find-
ing support for the impact of regret aversion on gambling behavior).
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an opportunity to avoid, or at least minimize, regret, while trial in-
creases the likelihood litigants will experience regret. Given the struc-
ture of our litigation system, the Regret Aversion Theory posits that
litigants will choose settlement over trial to avoid feelings of regret
associated with learning after trial that they should have settled. 150
III. TESTING THE REGRET AVERSION THEORY
To test the proposed Regret Aversion Theory of Litigation Be-
havior, I developed hypothetical litigation scenarios or vignettes that I
administered to students enrolled in first-year courses at the Univer-
sity of Missouri School of Law. In each of the scenarios I adminis-
tered, subjects read about two litigants who must choose to settle or
go forward with trial. After reading the facts of the case, subjects were
asked to indicate which of the two litigants would be most likely to
settle.
The subjects learn that the two litigants find themselves in identi-
cal situations. The only relevant difference between them is the juris-
diction in which each is litigating her case. The subjects learn that one
of the litigants is litigating in what I will call a "traditional" jurisdic-
tion. In the traditional jurisdiction, subjects learn that "the judge will
cease to participate in the case upon learning that the parties have
reached an out-of-court settlement." '15 1 This means the litigant will not
learn what would have happened at trial if she settles the case. The
other litigant, the subjects learn, is litigating in what I will call a "re-
gret" jurisdiction. In the regret jurisdiction, subjects learn that "the
150. While the purpose of this article is to propose that anticipated regret systematically
influences litigation decision making, regret may also affect litigation behavior directly if a liti-
gant or lawyer in a given dispute feels regret over some behavior occurring prior to, or during,
the litigation process. See, e.g., United States v. Stella, 448 F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 1971) ("No
doubt every trial lawyer who has lost a case can, when he holds his own mental post mortem,
find some act of omission or commission that he regrets."); South Boston Allied War Veterans
Council v. Zobel, 830 F. Supp. 643, 651 (D. Mass. 1993) ("In conclusion, this essentially is a
matter in which a disappointed party now regrets its initial decision to litigate its federal claims
in state court. This is not an extraordinary circumstance."); Fulton v. Amoco Oil Co., Civ. A. No.
87-4783, 1988 WL 74961, at *1 (E.D. Pa. July 11, 1988) ("Settlement agreements resolve litiga-
tion, not postpone it. That one party comes to regret having settled is no grounds for vitiating the
agreement. This is particularly true after the other party has performed its side of the bargain.");
United States v. Texas, 523 F. Supp. 703, 714 (E.D. Tex. 1981) ("In hindsight, following the entry
of a memorandum opinion and remedial order, defendants apparently regret these tactical deci-
sions made by their legal representative at trial. They believe that the outcome of the case might
have been more favorable to them had these stipulations not been entered into."); Fletcher v.
Fletcher, 628 N.E.2d 1343, 1348 (Ohio 1994) ("[A]n agreement signed without counsel is not per
se invalid, and mere regret at an unwise decision does not establish duress, coercion, fraud or
overreaching."); Land v. Land, 605 P.2d 1248, 1251 (Utah 1980) ("Equity is not available to
reinstate rights and privileges voluntarily contracted away simply because one has come to regret
the bargain made."). See generally Jonathan Baron, The Effect of Normative Beliefs on Antici-
pated Emotions, 63 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 320, 320-21 (1992) (describing the four
ways in which emotion can affect decision making).
151. Overtime and The Storm (unpublished surveys performed by author) (on file with au-
thor); see also text accompanying notes 155, 171.
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judge is required, upon learning that the parties have reached an out-
of-court settlement, to inform the parties of what he would have
awarded." '152 This means the litigant will learn what would have hap-
pened at trial if she settles the case.
Those litigating in a traditional jurisdiction can minimize the like-
lihood of experiencing postdecision regret by settling because they
will not learn that they could have done better at trial. Those litigating
in a regret jurisdiction, by contrast, face a real prospect of regret if
they settle because they may learn from the judge that they would
have done better at trial. The Regret Aversion Theory of Litigation
Behavior thus predicts that litigants pursuing their cases in a tradi-
tional jurisdiction will be more inclined to settle than those litigating
in a regret jurisdiction.
A. The Overtime Scenario
I administered the first scenario-"Overtime "153-to twenty-
seven students. In this scenario, the students read about two identical
disputes, one between Lisa and her employer and the other between
Martha and her employer. Lisa and Martha believe their respective
employers, Company ABC and Company XYZ, have failed to pay
them overtime compensation. To recover the overtime compensation
they believe they are owed, Lisa and Martha have filed suit against
their respective employers, seeking payment of $5,000.
Each learns from her lawyer that due to "the vagueness of the
law and the particular characteristics of her job" she has a "50%
chance of recovering $5,000 and a 50% chance of recovering $0, de-
pending upon whether the judge finds her to be a 'non-exempt' or an
'exempt' employee. ' 15" Thus, both Lisa and Martha face an expected
trial verdict valued at $2,500-i.e., 50% chance x $5,000 + 50% chance
x $0 = $2,500 expected value. Immediately prior to the hearing, Com-
pany ABC offers to settle Lisa's claim for $2,500, and Company XYZ
offers to settle Martha's claim for $2,500. Thus, each faces a choice
between a certain $2,500 settlement on the one hand and an expected
trial value of $2,500 on the other hand.
Lisa, the subjects learn, "is litigating in a jurisdiction where the
judge will cease to participate in the case upon learning that the par-
ties have reached an out-of-court settlement. 1 55 Because Lisa is liti-
152. Overtime, supra note 151; The Storm, supra note 151; see also text accompanying notes
155, 171.
153. Overtime, supra note 151.
154. Id. The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1998), re-
quires covered employers to pay minimum wages, § 206, and overtime compensation, § 207, to
all nonexempt employees. The FLSA exempts, however, several categories of employees from
the minimum wage and overtime requirements. § 213. Thus, an employee's entitlement to over-
time compensation will turn, at least in part, on whether that employee is deemed "exempt" or
"non-exempt" under the FLSA.
155. Overtime, supra note 151.
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gating in a "traditional" jurisdiction, she will not learn what the judge
would have decided at the hearing if she accepts the settlement offer.
Martha, by contrast, is litigating in a "regret" jurisdiction. She, the
subjects learn, "is litigating in a jurisdiction where the judge is re-
quired, upon learning that the parties have reached an out-of-court
settlement, to inform the parties of what he would have awarded at
the hearing." '156 Because Martha is litigating in a regret jurisdiction,
she will learn what the judge would have decided at the hearing if she
accepts the $2,500 settlement offer. The subjects are then asked to in-
dicate which of the plaintiffs-Lisa or Martha-is "most likely to ac-
cept the settlement offer. 15 7
The substance of the decision facing Lisa and Martha is identical.
Both are plaintiffs. Both must choose between a certain $2,500 settle-
ment offer and an expected trial verdict valued at $2,500. And both
have received identical legal advice from their respective attorneys
about the outcome of their cases. Because the substantive decision
facing Lisa and Martha is the same, the Economic and Framing Theo-
ries assume that subjects will express no preference for either Lisa or
Martha. That is, the Economic and Framing Theories predict that half
of the subjects will select Lisa and half Martha.
While the substance of the decision facing them is the same, the
emotional consequences are quite different. If Lisa accepts the settle-
ment offer, she will not face the prospect of learning she would have
done better at trial, but if Martha accepts, she will face that unpleas-
ant prospect. Thus, Lisa can minimize her regret by settling, but
Martha cannot.1 58 Because Lisa can minimize her regret by settling,
the Regret Aversion Theory predicts that subjects will identify Lisa as
"most likely to accept the settlement offer." 159
The results provide support for the Regret Aversion Theory. Of
the twenty-seven subjects who responded to the Overtime scenario,
twenty-two (81.5%) indicated that Lisa was most likely to accept the
settlement offer, while only five (18.5%) picked Martha. The differ-
ence between Lisa and Martha is highly statistically significant.1 60
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Of course, Lisa could subsequently learn from some other source that she might have
done better at trial (e.g., a plaintiff like Martha with a similar overtime compensation claim), or
she could imagine that she might have done better at trial. While either of these eventualities
could potentially produce some regret, the regret would not be nearly as salient for Lisa as for
Martha, who faces the daunting prospect of learning that she definitely would have done better
at trial. See supra text accompanying notes 137-39.
159. See supra text accompanying note 157. It is worth noting that there are reasons to
suspect that Martha, rather than Lisa, might be more inclined to settle. Curiosity, for example,
might make Martha more likely than Lisa to settle because she will learn whether her decision to
settle was "correct," while Lisa will not. See Paul Anand, Testing Regret, 31 MGMT. Sci. 114, 115
(1985) (identifying fascination, interest, and nosiness as other possible motivations).
160. binomial z=3.08, p < .001. To test whether the results (i.e., 81.5% Lisa versus 18.5%
Martha) were statistically significantly different from what the Economic Theory, Framing The-
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The survey asked the students why they picked one litigant over
the other. Most students provided answers consistent with the pro-
posed Regret Aversion Theory.161 "If Martha takes the $2,500 [and]
settles," one respondent explained, "there is a chance that she will
have to hear from the judge that she could have got [sic] the full
$5,000. Knowing that the judge could say she is entitled to the full
$5,000 when she already accepted the $2,500 is something she will not
want to hear.'1 62 Another respondent explained that Lisa "can be
confident that she did what was best for her, whereas Martha may
learn later that the judge would have ruled for her. That knowledge
could be an emotional blow to Martha.' 63 And still another ex-
plained, "I think that the plaintiff in the jurisdiction where the judge
ceases to participate upon settlement is most likely to [settle] because
never knowing what the judge would have decided, whether she
would have been better or worse off, will leave the least amount of
regret."'t 64
ory, and chance would have predicted (i.e., 50% Lisa versus 50% Martha), I performed a "bino-
mial test." See FREDERICK J. GRAVETrER & LARRY B. WALLNAU, STATISTICS FOR THE
BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 187 (2d ed. 1988). A binomial test "uses sample data to evaluate hypoth-
eses about the values of p and q for a population consisting of binomial data." Id. Binomial data
"exist whenever a measurement procedure classifies individuals into exactly two distinct catego-
ries," like "Lisa" and "Martha." Id. at 186.
161. See Survey #2 ("Martha is likely to feel her decision to accept $2,500 could look foolish
if the judge announces he would have awarded $5,000. Lisa does not feel that pressure."); Survey
#9 ("Lisa will feel like she has more control over the settlement + she won't have the feeling, as
much as Martha, that she could have possibly gotten more."); Survey #14 ("[Lisa] doesn't have
the thought in the back of her head that the judge or anyone else is going to inform her of what
the right move on her part might have been. She can accept without reservation that 'the judge
might have rewarded me more and he would tell me that is the case."'); Survey #17 ("If Lisa
accepts, she will not have the possibility of knowing the judge would have given her $5,000,
which would make her feel that she made the wrong decision. Martha would have that possibil-
ity, therefore it may deter her from accepting since she may find out she made a mistake.");
Survey #24 ("Because she won't learn what the judge would have decided [sic]. Lisa can feel
good about her decision because she will never know. Martha has a chance of being told she
would have gotten the entire $5,000."); Survey #26 ("Martha will be concerned that if she ac-
cepts the offer of $2,500 and then learns she would have won $5,000, she will be overly upset.
Lisa will never know, so she will be more likely to settle."); Survey #39 ("I really think both
would [settle], but I chose Lisa because she will never go through the possible agony of hearing a
judge say he would have gave [sic] 5K."); Survey #50 ("She [Lisa] has no way of knowing what
the judge decided (i.e. getting disappointed over judges [sic] decision)"); Survey #56 ("Because
Lisa will never know whether she would have gotten more or less. Martha, on the other hand, is
taking a real risk no matter what she decides."); Survey #62 ("It is easier to take the money + not
know what the judge would have ruled than to take it + possibly find out you would have gotten
more."). But see Survey #10 for an arguably rational explanation for why Lisa rather than
Martha was the "correct" choice ("B/C if Martha accepts and thinks that after the settlement the
judge says [sic] she would have lost, she may be concerned that difficulties may be encountered
in collecting the money from XYZ if they know [sic] the true result.").
162. Survey #1.
163. Survey #21.
164. Survey #25.
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B. The Storm Scenario
The Overtime scenario provides support for the Regret Aversion
Theory by suggesting that plaintiffs will factor anticipated regret into
their litigation decision making. To test whether regret aversion also
affects defendants, I administered a second scenario-"The
Storm"165-to another group of fifty-three students.166 In this scena-
rio-in contrast to the Overtime scenario-subjects were asked to
identify the settlement preferences of defendants facing losses rather
than plaintiffs facing gains. Subjects read about two identical disputes,
one between Patricia, a pedestrian, and Allison, a duplex owner, and
the other involving Pamela, also a pedestrian, and Elizabeth, the
owner of another duplex.
The subjects learn in this scenario that Patricia "slipped and fell
on the sidewalk in front of Allison's duplex unit" and that Pamela
"slipped and fell on the sidewalk in front of Elizabeth's duplex
unit." 167 Because both plaintiffs believe that the duplex owners "negli-
gently failed to remove snow and ice from the sidewalk," and that this
negligence caused their injuries, they filed suit against the duplex own-
ers, seeking $5,000 in damages. 168 Upon being sued, both duplex own-
ers, Allison and Elizabeth, retained counsel. Their respective
attorneys informed them that each plaintiff has about a "50% chance
of recovering $5,000 and a 50% chance of recovering $0" in a bench
trial. 169 Thus, both Allison and Elizabeth face an unattractive ex-
pected trial verdict valued at -$2,500-i.e., 50% chance x -$5,000 +
50% chance x $0 = -$2,500 expected value. Immediately prior to the
bench trial, "Patricia offered to settle her case and dismiss the lawsuit
if Allison would pay her $2,500," and "Pamela offered to settle her
case and dismiss the lawsuit if Elizabeth would pay her $2,500." 7°
Allison, the subjects learn, "has been sued in a jurisdiction where
the judge will cease to participate in the case upon learning that the
parties have reached an out-of-court settlement."'' Because Allison
165. The Storm, supra note 151.
166. By administering the first scenario to one set of subjects and the second scenario to
another set of subjects, I avoided the "practice effects" problem often associated with within-
subjects designs. See, e.g., SHAUGNESSY & ZECHMEISTER, supra note 96, at 214-15 (arguing that
repeated testing of a subject may result in practice effects that might undermine the validity of
the experimental results obtained).
167. The Storm, supra note 151.
168. Id.
169. Id. To establish negligence claims for their personal injuries, plaintiffs must prove duty,
breach, causation, and damages. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281 (1965);
W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 30, at 164-65 (5th ed.
1984). While most personal injury cases like this one are tried before juries rather than judges,
see, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Trial by Jury or Judge: Transcending Empir-
icism, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1124, 1140-41 (1992), roughly 9-35% of personal injury cases are, in
fact, bench trials. See id. at 1141 (reporting in their sample of federal cases that 8.9% to 34.9% of
various types of personal injury cases were tried by judges rather than juries).
170. The Storm, supra note 151.
171. Id.
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has been sued in a traditional jurisdiction, she will not learn what the
judge would have decided in the case if she agrees to pay Patricia the
$2,500 settlement. Elizabeth, by contrast, has been sued in a regret
jurisdiction. She, the subjects learn, "has been sued in a jurisdiction
where the judge is required, upon learning that the parties have
reached an out-of-court settlement, to inform the parties of what he
would have awarded at trial."' 7 2 Because Elizabeth has been sued in a
regret jurisdiction, she will learn what the judge would have decided
in the case if she agrees to pay Pamela the $2,500 settlement. The
subjects are then asked to indicate which defendant-Allison or Eliza-
beth-is "most likely to pay the requested settlement.'
1 73
Allison and Elizabeth must make identical substantive decisions.
Both are defendants. Both must choose between paying a certain
$2,500 settlement or facing an expected trial verdict of -$2,500. Both
have received the same prediction from their respective attorneys
about the outcome of their cases. Because the substantive decision
facing Allison and Elizabeth is the same, the Economic and Framing
Theories assume that subjects will express no preference for either
Allison or Elizabeth. That is, the Economic and Framing Theories
predict that half of the subjects will select Allison and half Elizabeth.
While the substance of the decision facing them is the same, the
emotional consequences are quite different. If Allison agrees to pay
the settlement demand, she will not face the prospect of learning she
would have done better at trial, but if Elizabeth pays, she will face that
unpleasant prospect. Thus, Allison can minimize her regret by settling,
but Elizabeth cannot. 174 Because Allison can minimize her regret by
settling, the Regret Aversion Theory predicts that subjects will iden-
tify Allison as "most likely to pay the requested settlement.1' 75
The experimental results provide support for the proposed the-
ory. Of the fifty-three subjects who responded to The Storm scenario,
forty-two (79.2%) indicated that Allison was most likely to accept the
settlement offer, while only eleven (20.8%) picked Elizabeth. The dif-
ference between Allison and Elizabeth, like the difference between
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Of course, Allison could subsequently learn from some other source that she might
have done better at trial (e.g., a defendant who had a similar slip-and-fall claim lodged against
her), or she could imagine that she might have done better at trial. While either of these eventu-
alities could potentially result in some regret, the regret would not be nearly as salient for Al-
lison as for Elizabeth, who faces the daunting prospect of learning that she definitely would have
done better at trial. See supra text accompanying notes 137-39.
175. See supra text accompanying note 173. It is worth noting that there are reasons to
suspect that Elizabeth, rather than Allison, might be more inclined to pay the requested settle-
ment. Curiosity, for instance, might prompt Elizabeth to settle because she will learn whether
her decision to settle was the "right" one, while Allison will not. See Anand, supra note 159, at
115 (identifying fascination, interest, and nosiness as other possible motivations).
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Lisa and Martha in the Overtime scenario, is highly statistically
significant. 76
When asked on the survey why they chose the way they did, most
students provided answers consistent with the proposed Regret Aver-
sion Theory of Litigation Behavior. 177 One respondent exclaimed, "I
don't think Eliz[abeth] could stand knowing, if it did go the other way
after paying.' 17' Another student echoed these sentiments, explaining
that Allison "will never know if she would have won or lost. Elizabeth
may be distraught at finding out she [paid] $2,500 unnecessarily.' 179
And another respondent chose Allison because "if Elizabeth pays &
later finds out she wouldn't have needed to, she would really regret
it.'180
C. Conclusion
The experimental work reported here provides evidence that liti-
gants seek to minimize postdecision regret by settling rather than try-
ing their cases. In the Overtime scenario, plaintiffs Lisa and Martha
faced identical substantive decisions, yet Lisa (traditional jurisdiction)
appeared substantially more likely than Martha (regret jurisdiction) to
accept the settlement offer. Similarly, in The Storm scenario, defend-
ants Allison and Elizabeth faced identical substantive decisions, yet
Allison (traditional jurisdiction) appeared substantially more likely
than Elizabeth (regret jurisdiction) to pay the requested settlement
176. binomial z=4.12, p < .0001. See GRAVETrER & WALLNAU, supra note 160, at 187.
177. See Survey #121 ("She doesn't want to know if she made [a] mistake."); Survey #128
("Never knowing what the judge will decide makes it easier for Allison to take the settlement
and convince herself that she's made the best choice. She doesn't face the possibility of knowing
that she chose incorrectly."); Survey #133 ("Realistically no difference, but it just feels better to
settle if you don't know. Ugly dogs aren't unhappy because they don't know their [sic] ugly.");
Survey #136 ("Allison will never experience the pain of knowing what might have been. Better
to not know."); Survey #137 ("Because if you paid the $ you want that to be the end of things,
you wouldn't want to know what the judge would have decided if you hadn't paid because he
could have decided in your favor."); Survey #138 ("Not knowing the outcome would not result in
2nd thoughts by Allison. But it would in Elizabeth's case."); Survey #143 ("Because she won't
have to find out that the judge decided [sic] she never had to pay anything."); Survey #145 ("If
Elizabeth is going to find out how the judge would decide the case, it would probably anger her
more afterwards if she paid $2,500 and discovered later she would have won the case."); Survey
#150 ("Allison will never know that she was possibly wrong! People who will find out if [sic] they
were possibly wrong are hesitant to act."); Survey #163 ("I think myself, and a lot of people
would rather pay the money either 1/2 or all or whatever and never know if they could have won
in court so they wouldn't always kick themselves if they would have won. Its [sic] better to just
assume that your money was well spent."); Survey #167 ("It seems you would more [sic] about
regretting your choice where you would learn of the judges [sic] decision."); Survey #171 ("She
knows that her piece of mind will not be disturbed by a judge telling her that he would've ruled
in her favor."); Survey #172 ("It would be too painful to find out you should not have settled. If
you couldn't just settle + have the lawsuit over with, you might as well go on w/ the lawsuit. Part
of settling is going on w/ life + leaving the conflict behind you."). But see Survey #120 ("It is
easier to pay the 2500.00, if you know that no one will second guess your decision.").
178. Survey #132 (emphasis in original).
179. Survey #146.
180. Survey #160.
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demand. Both Lisa in the Overtime scenario and Allison in The Storm
scenario appeared more likely to settle because of the prospective
emotional consequences-i.e., the anticipated regret-associated with
their decisions.
While I acknowledge the methodological limitations associated
with the hypothetical scenario approach-including its within-subjects
design8 1 and concerns about external validity182-I contend nonethe-
less that this approach makes it possible to isolate the role anticipated
regret plays in litigation decision making in a way that few, if any,
other methodologies could. 8 3 Moreover, the experimental work re-
ported here is corroborated by prior experimental work in other do-
mains,184 anecdotal evidence, 85 and our collective intuition about
181. A "within-subjects" or "within-groups" design-in contrast to a "between-subjects" or
"between-groups" design-is one in which subjects are assigned to a single group. The experi-
menter administers the independent variable being tested to all subjects within the group and
derives conclusions regarding the impact of that variable by observing differences within the
group, rather than between an experimental group and a control group. See ROBERT THOMAS
MALESKE, FOUNDATIONS FOR GATHERING AND INTERPRETING BEHAVIORAL DATA 210 (1995);
SHAUGHNESSY & ZECHMEISTER, supra note 96, at 212-24.
The potential problem with within-subjects designs is that "they are liable to induce the
effect which they are intended to test." Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, On the Study of
Statistical Intuitions, 11 COGNrION 123, 131 (1982). While I acknowledge this methodological
concern, I do not think it is warranted here. The scenarios I employ admittedly focus subjects'
attention on the difference between the decisions facing the litigants in each scenario, but the
decisions facing the two litigants differ along many dimensions-regret-minimizing versus re-
gret-maximizing, curiosity-satisfying versus non-curiosity-satisfying, passive versus active, usual
versus unusual, etc. Thus, the scenarios do not simply induce subjects to make regret-averse
choices.
Moreover, a number of researchers have employed a design comparable to this one to study
aspects of regret. See, e.g., Thomas Gilovich & Victoria Husted Medvec, The Temporal Pattern to
the Experience of Regret, 67 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 357 (1994) [hereinafter Gilovich
& Medvec, Temporal Pattern]; Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, The Psychology of Prefer-
ences, 246 Sci. AM. 160, 173 (1982); Landman, Regret and Elation, supra note 125, at 528-34. But
see Ahogni N'gbala & Nyla R. Branscombe, When Does Action Elicit More Regret Than Inaction
and Is Counterfactual Mutation the Mediator of This Effect?, 33 J. EXPERIMENTAL Soc.
PSYCHOL. 324, 325 (1997) (arguing that there are interpretational problems associated with the
use of within-subjects designs in research on the differential impact of action and inaction on
regret).
182. External validity "is a measure of how certain we are that a relationship observed in a
controlled experiment will also be valid outside of the conditions of that experiment." MALESKE,
supra note 181, at 150. "It is often difficult to generalize from results obtained under such condi-
tions [contrived laboratory experiments] to more realistic injurious experiences and disputes."
Dan Coates & Steven Penrod, Social Psychology and the Emergence of Disputes, 15 L. & Soc'y
REv. 655, 667 (1981). See generally Korobkin & Guthrie, Psychological Barriers, supra note 8, at
126-28. While I recognize the external validity concerns that can be voiced about the methodol-
ogy I use here, I contend, nonetheless, that this type of experimental approach is the most relia-
ble means of establishing the impact of a given variable on behavior.
183. Additionally, while "[e]very type of study, and every individual study, inevitably will be
imperfect," Michael J. Saks, What Do Jury Experiments Tell Us About How Juries (Should)
Make Decisions?, 6 S. CAL. INTERDISCIPLINARY L.J. 1, 5 (1997), the advantage of a "law and
social science" approach like this one is that it offers "assertions about the law that are empiri-
cally refutable." Macey, supra note 100, at 172. Thus, further work can provide additional sup-
port for, or refutation of, the assertions I make about the impact of anticipated regret on
litigation behavior. See, e.g., Saks, supra, at 5 (arguing that "replication" and "triangulation" can
provide "increasing confidence in the conclusions"); supra note 100.
184. See supra notes 140-49.
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how people make decisions under risky conditions. Taken together,
this evidence provides ample support for the Regret Aversion
Theory. 186
IV. REGRET AVERSION AND LAWYERING
The proposed Regret Aversion Theory posits-and the evidence
reported here suggests-that litigants systematically prefer settlement
to trial because it enables them to avoid regret they anticipate feeling
posttrial. The fact that litigant decision making is systematically influ-
enced by anticipated regret raises profound questions for lawyers.
While a comprehensive treatment of this topic is beyond the scope of
185. See, e.g., WERTH, supra note 1; see also Jerome Groopman, Decoding Destiny, NEW
YORKER, Feb. 9, 1998, at 42, 46-47. Describing how his patient Karen had been persuaded by her
older sister Ruth to undergo a preemptive mastectomy/oophorectomy, the author writes:
"Ruth said that I was one of the lucky ones," Karen went on, her eyes moist. "I had been
given advance warning, by our mother and by her. That my relationship with Sam could
survive any changes in my body, as hers had with her husband, despite the cancer and chem-
otherapy. And that I would never stop being who I am." Karen paused, and I reached out to
grip her trembling hand. "Ruth said she wished someone had told her to have a mastec-
tomy. Not just in hindsight, not just because now she has cancer. But because she would
know that she had done everything possible to try to prevent it, and wouldn't live with
regret."
Id.; see also Jason Zweig, Five Investing Lessons from America's Top Pension Funds, MONEY,
Jan. 1998, at 114, 118 (Professor Harry M. Markowitz, Nobel Prize-winning economist, reports
how he invests his personal retirement funds: "I should have computed the historical covariances
of the asset classes and drawn an efficient frontier. Instead, I visualized my grief ... if [the stock
market] went way down and I was completely in it. My intention was to minimize my future
regret. So I split my contributions fifty-fifty between bonds and equities.").
186. While the Regret Aversion Theory posits that regret aversion systematically influences
litigation decision making, litigants appear to behave in a regret-seeking way in a tiny minority of
civil cases involving "high-low agreements." In a high-low agreement, "[t]he plaintiff agrees to
collect no more than a maximum amount specified in the agreement, regardless of a higher jury
verdict, while the defendant agrees to pay no less than a minimum amount specified in the
agreement, regardless of a lower jury verdict." Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Don't Try:
Civil Jury Verdicts in a System Geared to Settlement, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1, 61 (1996). See generally
Robert Coulson, Negotiating Control Contracts: Trial Counsel Reduce Their Need for Appeals, 52
JUDICATURE 190 (1968); John L. Shanahan, The High-Low Agreement, FOR THE DEFENSE, July
1991, at 25. Thus, both parties bargain for the prospect of facing regret because they agree to
face the prospect of learning that they would have done better through trial than they did
through their high-low settlement agreement.
Consider, for example, a $200,000/$100,000 high/low agreement. "If a jury returns a no
cause verdict or $1 up to and including $100,000, then the plaintiff is awarded $100,000. If a jury
returns a verdict of $100,000.01 up to and including $200,000, then the specific verdict amount
governs. (In other words, if the verdict is $150,000, then the plaintiff receives $150,000.) If a jury
returns a verdict exceeding $200,000, then the plaintiff is entitled to only the $200,000 maxi-
mum." Steven R. Gabel, High/Low Settlement Agreements: Method for Dispute Resolution, 73
MICH. B.J. 74, 74 (1994). In this instance, then, plaintiff faces the prospect of regret if the jury
returns a verdict in excess of $200,000, while the defendant faces the prospect of regret if the jury
returns a verdict less than $100,000.
For recently reported high-low agreements and the resulting jury verdicts, see, for example,
$18.6 Million Verdict in Suit Arising from Uterine Rupture During Childbirth, 17 VERDICTS, SET-
TLEMENTS & TACTICS 469 (1997); Dentist Found Liable for Negligent Injection of Lidocaine, 17
VERDICTS, SETrLEMENTS & TACTICS 425 (1997); Settlement in Dram Shop Suit, 17 VERDICTS,
SETrLEMENTS & TACTIcs 3 (1997); Surgeon Found Liable for Delay in Treating Trauma Patient,
17 VERDICTS, SETILEMENTS & TACTICS 344 (1997); Surgeon Found Liable in Suit Involving Co-
lostomy, 17 VERDICTS, SET-rLEMENTS & TACTICs 240 (1997).
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this article, I briefly explore in this part three key challenges facing the
regret-savvy lawyer: recognizing regret aversion, advising the regret-
averse client, and litigating against the regret-averse adversary.
A. Challenge #1: Recognizing Regret Aversion
The first challenge facing regret-savvy lawyers is to assess the ex-
tent to which regret aversion is likely to influence their clients and
adversaries. Litigants are generally prone to regret-averse decision
making,187 but the degree to which any particular litigant is regret
averse is likely to depend on a number of factors. While there are no
hard and fast rules for assessing litigant regret aversion, I suggest be-
low that lawyers can look to certain clues-the type of litigant, litigant
personality, case type, and procedural posture-to help them assess
the extent to which their clients and adversaries are likely to base liti-
gation decisions on regret aversion.
1. Type of Litigant
Lawyers should first look to the type of client they are represent-
ing, and the type of adversary they are litigating against, because cer-
tain types of litigants seem more likely to make regret-averse
decisions than others. Most significantly, lawyers are likely to find that
individual litigants are more likely to exhibit regret aversion than in-
stitutional litigants.
Institutional litigants, like insurance companies, governmental
bodies, and Fortune 500 corporations, are generally repeat players
with active caseloads who are likely to view litigation primarily as a
financial matter,188 while individual litigants are often one-shot play-
ers who are more prone to view litigation as a financial and emotional
matter. 189 Moreover, because institutional litigants may make hun-
dreds of litigation decisions in their various cases, the financial and
emotional consequences of a "wrong" decision do not loom as large
for them as for the individual litigant making relatively few such deci-
sions. Finally, individual litigants may be advised by loved ones and
lawyers, but they ultimately make litigation decisions that will have
financial and emotional consequences primarily for them. Institutional
litigants, by contrast, are often comprised of teams of decision mak-
ers-in-house lawyers, middle managers, and executives-making de-
cisions that will have consequences primarily for the institution of
which they are a part. 190 Regret aversion seems more likely to affect
187. See supra Part III.
188. See generally Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the
Limits of Legal Change, 9 L. & Soc'y REv. 95 (1974).
189. See generally id.
190. Of course, such decisions may also have consequences for the individual or individuals
making the decisions on behalf of an institution, but the primary impact will usually be on the
institution rather than the individual or individuals.
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individuals deciding for themselves than groups deciding for an
institution.
2. Litigant Personality
Second, lawyers should also recognize that some individual liti-
gants are likely to be more susceptible to regret aversion than others.
There is empirical evidence suggesting, for instance, that individuals
with lower self-esteem are more likely to exhibit regret aversion than
those with relatively higher self-esteem.1 91 Thus, litigants who lack
confidence generally, or about the litigation process specifically, may
be more prone to settle due to regret aversion than relatively more
confident litigants.
3. Case Type
Lawyers should also assess the type of case in which they are in-
volved because regret aversion may play a more prominent role in
certain types of cases than in others. It seems likely, for instance, that
regret aversion may play a more prominent role in ordinary civil cases
than in cases fraught with emotion. Consider, for example, a bread-
and-butter civil case-like a simple auto accident case where plaintiff
and defendant bear no particular ill will toward one another-and a
relatively emotional case-like a libel case or a medical malpractice
case. Because feelings of anger, pride, and vengeance in the libel and
malpractice cases may "trump" prospective regretful feelings (at least
on the part of the allegedly libeled plaintiff and the defendant doctor),
it seems likely that regret aversion will play a more prominent role in
the ordinary civil case. Consistent with this hypothesis, ordinary civil
cases, e.g., auto accident cases, settle at a much higher rate than libel
and medical malpractice cases.192
4. Procedural Posture
Finally, lawyers should also expect regret aversion to play a more
prominent role in litigant decision making at certain points in the liti-
gation process, namely, when the prospect of regret seems most sali-
ent. The prospect of regret is likely to seem most salient when clients
expect to receive imminent, potentially adverse, case-threatening rul-
191. See Josephs et al., supra note 132, at 28; Larrick, Motivational Factors, supra note 6, at
446.
192. See Randall P. Bezanson, The Libel Suit in Retrospect: What Plaintiffs Want and What
Plaintiffs Get, 74 CAL. L. REV. 789, 790 n.3 (1986) (noting that "[ilnformation provided from a
variety of sources, including the case histories of over 1300 insurance claims, suggests that the
incidence of settlement activity in libel casesis much lower than for civil litigation in general");
Gross & Syverud, supra note 186, at 58 (noting that "the trial rate in medical malpractice cases is
considerably higher across the nation than for any other category of personal injury litigation");
Gross & Syverud, supra note 27, at 364 (reporting that "[o]nly about 2% of California personal
injury suits go to jury trial," while "[niational studies indicate that at least 6-7% of medical
malpractice suits reach jury trial, and perhaps as many as 10%").
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ings. 193 So, for example, litigants are particularly likely to feel regret
averse on the eve of trial, and perhaps, may settle as a result. 194 In-
deed, regret aversion may partially explain the plethora of "court-
house steps" settlements. 195
B. Challenge #2: Advising the Regret-Averse Client
The second challenge facing regret-savvy lawyers is to determine
how to advise regret-averse clients to make optimal litigation deci-
sions. At a minimum, lawyers should recognize that their clients are
generally prone to regret aversion and that regret aversion may either
facilitate or frustrate optimal client decision making.
There are good reasons for lawyers to encourage their clients to
base their litigation decisions at least in part on the regret they might
feel if a decision turns out poorly. Although economic theorists be-
lieve that "rational people base their decisions on their expectations
of the future rather than on their regrets about the past,' 196 regret is
"something we shall experience just as surely as we experience the
other consequences of our decisions."'197 Thus, it seems rational-at
least in a lay sense' 98-to factor the prospect of anticipated regret into
litigation decision making. 99 Moreover, anticipated regret may "facil-
193. See supra notes 137-39 and accompanying text.
194. Scholars have observed settlement behavior akin to this (though they have offered an
alternative explanation for it) in final offer arbitrations conducted in major league baseball
where "almost all cases proceed to the point where offers are submitted to the arbiter," but
"relatively few cases actually proceed to arbitration." Amy Farmer & Paul Pecorino, Bargaining
with Informative Offers: An Analysis of Final-Offer Arbitration, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 415, 415
(1998). "For example, in major league baseball in 1992, 157 players filed for arbitration. Of these
cases, 21 settled prior to the exchange of offers, and 20 cases proceeded to the arbitration stage.
In 116 cases, final offers were exchanged, but settlement occurred prior to the arbitration hear-
ing." Id. at 416.
195. See, e.g., Peter Toll Hoffman, Valuation of Cases for Settlement: Theory and Practice,
1991 J. Disp. RESOL. 1, 30 ("It is common knowledge among trial attorneys that serious settle-
ment discussions often do not begin until the eve of trial, and there are many tales of settlements
made literally on the courthouse steps.").
196. RIcHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 8 (4th ed. 1992).
197. Hershey & Baron, supra note 28, at 207.
198. See generally Kahneman, New Challenges, supra note 40, at 105.
199. Scholars have engaged in a fairly lively debate about whether individuals who factor
regret into their decision making can be said to be deciding "rationally." In their initial work on
regret theory, Loomes and Sugden proposed regret theory as a theory of rational choice and
argued that "if an individual does experience such feelings [i.e., regret or rejoicing], we cannot
see how he can be deemed irrational for consistently taking those feelings into account." Loomes
& Sugden, Regret Theory, supra note 126, at 820. In a later article, however, Sugden modified his
earlier position, arguing that regret theory is a rational choice theory of a different kind. Sugden,
Regret, Recrimination, and Rationality, supra note 110, at 77. Explaining the difference between
expected utility theory and regret theory, Sugden writes:
A person who acts according to expected utility theory has a complete and internally consis-
tent pattern of preferences-a master plan-for dealing with every possible contingency
within a very broad class of choice problems. If the axioms of that theory have normative
content, it is because they provide guidance to individuals when drawing up such master
plans.
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itate[ ] high-quality decision making" 2" by prompting a litigant to en-
gage in. "vigilant appraisal of each course of action '20 1 and to
construct "inventive solutions that take account of calculated risks. 20 2
There are also good reasons, however, for lawyers to attempt to
dissuade their clients from basing litigation decisions solely, or even
primarily, on anticipated regret. First, individuals are notoriously bad
at predicting how they will feel in the future. They "have a hard time
assessing what [an] experience will actually be like, ' 20 3 "lack skill in
the task of predicting how their tastes might change,"2 4 and "overes-
timate the overall magnitude and generality of the positive or negative
feeling generated by an event. ' 2 5 Researchers have found, for in-
stance, that lottery winners are not as happy as might be expected and
paralyzed accident victims are not as unhappy.20 6
Even assuming people correctly anticipate the regret they will
feel, their regrets are likely to change over time. Researchers have
found that there is "a consistent temporal pattern to the experience of
regret.'207 While much of this work has focused on the intriguing re-
search result that "[a]ctions produce greater regret in the short-term,
... Regret theory, in contrast, comes into its own when people don't have master plans
of this kind.... In other words, people may repeatedly behave as regret theory predicts, but
they do not do so as part of a conscious plan. Regret theory describes some of the regulari-
ties in human behaviour that occur because people sometimes don't know how they should
choose.
Id. at 96. But see Keasey, supra note 129, at 648 (challenging Loomes's and Sugden's claims that
regret theory is rational).
I agree with Cass Sunstein that "[i]t is far less important to struggle over whether" it is
rational for litigants to incorporate regret into their decision making "than to be as clear as
possible on how human beings actually behave." Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis, supra note 61, at
1175 n.3.
200. JANIS & MANN, supra note 125, at 222.
201. Id. at 224.
202. Id.
203. Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis, supra note 61, at 1184.
204. Kahneman, New Challenges, supra note 40, at 121-22.
205. Philip Brickman et al., Lottery Winners and Accident Victims: Is Happiness Relative?, 36
J. PERSONALrrY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 917, 926 (1978).
206. See id.
207. Gilovich & Medvec, Temporal Pattern, supra note 181, at 361. For additional sources
documenting the "temporal pattern ... of regret," see, for example, Gilovich & Medvec, Experi-
ence of Regret, supra note 107, at 381 (reviewing evidence regarding the temporal pattern of
regret and proposing "a framework to organize the various psychological mechanisms that give
rise to this temporal pattern"); Richard T. Kinnier & Arlene T. Metha, Regrets and Priorities at
Three Stages of Life, 33 COUNSELING & VALUES 182, 183 (1989) (exploring "the most often cited
regrets and priorities of men and women at three stages of life"); Savitsky et al., supra note 125,
at 249 (hypothesizing that "the Zeigarnik effect, or the tendency for people to remember incom-
pleted tasks better than completed tasks, might play an important role in the temporal pattern to
the experience of regret" (citation omitted)).
For sources examining the life regrets of particular subpopulations, see, for example, Alex-
ander et al., supra note 105 (older women); DeGenova, supra note 105 (retired individuals);
Nina Hattiangadi et al., Failing to Act: Regrets of Terman's Geniuses, 40 INr'L J. AGING & HUM.
DEV. 175 (1995) (elderly gifted individuals); Arlene T. Metha et al., A Pilot Study on the Regrets
and Priorities of Women, 13 PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 167 (1989) (women).
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whereas inactions generate more regret in the long run,"2 °8 this work
stands for the general proposition that people experience regret dif-
ferently over time. Thus, even if litigants accurately anticipate the re-
gret they will feel posttrial, lawyers should bear in mind that their
clients' feelings of regret are likely to dissipate, change, and hopefully
even disappear in time.2 °9
Third, even if time does not heal, litigants may be able to mini-
mize, or even eliminate, regret through a number of psychological
mechanisms, including dissonance reduction,21 ° feature matching,211
and cognitive buffering.212 Research on these mechanisms suggests lit-
208. Gilovich & Medvec, Temporal Pattern, supra note 181, at 361.
209. But see Len Lecci et al., Life Regrets and Current Goals as Predictors of Psychological
Adjustment, 66 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 731, 737 (1994) (noting that for a number of
reasons "regrets may turn more decidedly negative as the individual ages").
210. Cognitive dissonance theory, as originally formulated by Leon Festinger, was com-
prised of two hypotheses. First, "[t]he existence of dissonance, being psychologically uncomfort-
able, will motivate the person to try to reduce the dissonance and achieve consonance." LEON
FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE 3 (1957). Second, "[w]hen dissonance is
present, in addition to trying to reduce it, the person will actively avoid situations and informa-
tion which would likely increase the dissonance." Id. "Cognitive dissonance can be seen," in
short, "as an antecedent condition which leads to activity oriented toward dissonance reduction
just as hunger leads to activity oriented toward hunger reduction." Id.
According to the theory, "dissonance is an almost inevitable consequence of a decision." Id.
at 36. Because dissonance is unpleasant, "the existence of dissonance will give rise to pressures
to reduce it." Id. at 42. Individuals can reduce postdecision dissonance "by increasing the attrac-
tiveness of the chosen alternative and decreasing the attractiveness of the rejected alternative."
Leon Festinger, Introduction, in CONFLICT, DECISION, AND DISSONANCE 1, 5-6 (Leon Festinger
ed., 1964). Experimental data confirms that this process of "spreading apart of the attractiveness
of the alternatives" does in fact occur. Id. at 6. For more recent refinements, see Thomas R.
Shultz et al., Free Choice and Cognitive Dissonance Revisited: Choosing "Lesser Evils" Versus
"Greater Goods", 25 PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. BULL. 40 (1999) (showing that a difficult
choice between less desirable alternatives produces a large increase in a decision maker's
postdecision evaluation of the chosen alternative, while a difficult choice between more desira-
ble alternatives produces a large decrease in the decision maker's postdecision evaluation of the
rejected alternative).
211. Closely related to dissonance reduction is "feature matching." See David A. Houston et
al., Feature Matching, Unique Features, and the Dynamics of the Choice Process: Predecision
Conflict and Postdecision Satisfaction, 27 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 411 (1991). Re-
searchers have found that postdecision regret or satisfaction "will differ depending on which
features of the items are unique and whether the chosen or the rejected item is the focus of
attention." Id. at 426. Thus, when individuals have selected between unique good items, they can
increase postdecision satisfaction and minimize postdecision regret "by concentrating on the
chosen alternative." Id. When individuals have chosen between unique bad items, they can in-
crease postdecision satisfaction and minimize postdecision regret "by concentrating on the re-
jected alternative." Id.
212. Recognizing that "people have available to them positive illusions about themselves,
the world, and the future that enable them to experience positive emotions," Shelley E. Taylor et
al., Emotions as Psychological Achievements, in EMOTIONS: ESSAYS ON EMOTION THEORY 219,
219 (Stephanie H.M. Van Goozen et al. eds., 1994), researchers have explored whether "similar
processes may buffer individuals against the negative outcomes of decisions that they choose or
for which they assume responsibility." Id. at 224. Researchers studied the efforts of renal pa-
tients to cognitively buffer the adverse consequences associated with their decisions to undergo
kidney transplants that were ultimately unsuccessful. See id. at 225-27. They found "that when
people are involved in decisions that affect them, they may be cognitively buffered, at least to a
degree, against the adverse outcomes of those decisions." Id. at 227.
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igants possess the psychological wherewithal to dampen regretful feel-
ings associated with an unfortunate litigation decision.
Finally, even if litigants anticipate and experience postdecision
regret, they may find that the regret they feel is actually a productive
emotion that can help them improve future decision making.213 Be-
cause regret can provide the impetus for improvement, lawyers again
might dissuade their clients from allowing the fear of regret to prevent
them from making the litigation decisions they would otherwise make.
C. Challenge #3: Litigating Against the Regret-Averse Adversary
The third challenge facing regret-savvy lawyers is to use their ad-
versaries' regret aversion to facilitate favorable litigation results for
their own clients. Lawyers should recognize not only that their clients
are prone to regret-averse decision making, but also that their adver-
saries are prone to regret-averse decision making.2 14 Armed with this
insight, lawyers can create emotional leverage in settlement negotia-
tions by proposing settlement at those points in the litigation process
when their adversaries are most likely to feel regret averse, e.g., after
filing a dispositive motion but prior to receiving a judge's ruling.
Consider, for example, the medical malpractice case chronicled in
the recently published book, Damages.15 In that case, the Sabia fam-
ily filed suit against a doctor and hospital for injuries resulting to their
son, Tony, prior to his birth. Near the end of a lengthy litigation pro-
cess, counsel for the defendant, Doyle, used regret aversion to facili-
tate settlement. Doyle filed a motion to strike plaintiff Donna Sabia's
claim for emotional distress. Doyle realized, at least intuitively, that
Donna would anticipate feeling regretful if she refused to settle and
the judge subsequently ruled favorably on Doyle's motion:
Doyle as promised filed his last-minute motion to strike Donna's
claim for emotional stress. With a trial imminent, he wanted the
213. Psychotherapists often view regret as a tool for therapeutic change. See, e.g., Greenberg
& FitzPatrick, supra note 112, at 35-36 (arguing that regret is an "essential ingredient" in psycho-
therapy): Harold H. Mosak, Guilt, Guilt Feelings, Regret, and Repentance, 43 INDIVIDUAL
PSYCHOL. 288, 292 (1987) (arguing that therapists should seek to "substitute regret for guilty
feeling[s]"); Jeanne Shaw, The Usefulness of Remorse, 5 PSYCHOTHERAPY PATIENT 77, 78-79
(1989) (arguing that regret or remorse can be a productive emotion). See also IRVIN D. YALOM,
LYING ON THE COUCH 179-80 (1996), stating:
With many of his patients, Ernest [a psychotherapist in this novel] introduced the concept of
regret into his therapy. He asked patients to examine regrets for their past conduct and
urged them to avoid future regrets. "The goal," he'd say, "is to live so that five years from
now you won't look back on these five years filled with regret." Occasionally Ernest's "an-
ticipatory regret" strategy fell flat. Generally it proved meaningful.
But see Stanley Rosner, On the Place of Regrets in Psychoanalytic Psychotherapy, 11 PSYCHOA-
NALYSIS & PSYCHOTHERAPY 86, 87 (1994) ("Fear of facing regrets may serve as a form of resist-
ance to entering treatment as well as resistance to remaining in and progressing further in the
treatment process."); Peter Shabad, Fixation and the Road Not Taken, 4 PSYCHOANALYTIC
PSYCHOL. 187, 197-200 (1987) (arguing that feelings of regret may produce resistance to change).
214. See supra Part IV.A.
215. WERTH, supra note 1.
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Sabias to know that one of the costs of refusing to settle was that
Donna might well end up with no money of her own. Whether or
not he knew the intimate details of the Sabias' domestic history,
he, like Koskoff [plaintiff's counsel], knew exactly which buttons
to push to make his opponents squirm.2"6
In short, lawyers, like Doyle, who recognize that their adversaries are
prone to regret-aversion should be able to use this knowledge to facili-
tate favorable settlements for their clients.
V. CONCLUSION
The Regret Aversion Theory proposed in this article offers new
insights into litigant decision making by providing evidence suggesting
that litigants are systematically inclined to settle due to the regret they
anticipate feeling posttrial. The Regret Aversion Theory also poses
novel challenges to lawyers seeking to understand their clients' needs
and wishes, to help their clients make optimal decisions, and to obtain
desirable results for their clients through the litigation process. Per-
haps most significantly, however, the Regret Aversion Theory sheds
new light on the civil justice system within which litigants and lawyers
litigate their disputes.
The civil justice system is characterized first and foremost by set-
tlement. 217 The conventional view of our settlement-dominated civil
justice system-the economic view-sees litigants as economically ra-
tional actors who seek to maximize their financial outcomes. Because
the cost of trial exceeds the cost of settlement, the Economic Theory
posits that most litigants will settle for financial reasons. According to
the Economic Theory, the civil justice system facilitates settlement by
creating financial incentives to settle and financial disincentives to go
to trial.
The Framing Theory offers an alternative view of the civil justice
system. The Framing Theory views litigants not merely as litigants, but
as plaintiffs and defendants. Plaintiffs view potential litigation results
as gains, so they exhibit a preference for settlement. Defendants view
potential litigation results as losses, so they are more inclined to liti-
gate. From the perspective of the Framing Theory, as law and eco-
216. Id. at 331.
217. See, e.g., Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, 'Most Cases Settle': Judicial Promotion and Reg-
ulation of Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1339, 1339 (1994) (noting that "settlement is the most
frequent disposition of civil cases in the United States"); Gross & Syverud, supra note 186, at 2
("Of the hundreds of thousands of civil lawsuits that are filed each year in America, the great
majority are settled; of those that are not settled, most are ultimately dismissed by the plaintiffs
or by the courts; only a few percent are tried to a jury or a judge."); Michael J. Saks, Do We
Really Know Anything About the Behavior of the Tort Litigation System-And Why Not?, 140 U.
PA. L. REV. 1147, 1212 (1992) (noting that "[slettlement is where the action is"); David M.
Trubek et al., The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31 UCLA L. REV. 72, 81 (1983) (finding in their
sample that approximately eight percent of civil suits filed in state and federal courts went to
trial).
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nomics scholar Tom Ulen observes, "litigation is more likely than
previous analysis had suggested."21
The competing views offered by the Economic and Framing The-
ories raise a puzzling question about the workings of the civil justice
system: Given that the Framing Theory rests on a much stronger em-
pirical foundation than the Economic Theory,219 why do the Eco-
nomic Theory's predictions about the high rate of settlement seem
more accurate? While a number of answers to this question are possi-
ble,22 0 I suggest that the Regret Aversion Theory offers a particularly
plausible response.
The Regret Aversion Theory views litigants as regret-averse
human beings who settle their cases at least in part to avoid the un-
pleasant feeling of regret. According to this theory, the civil justice
system-through its very structure,22 ' its rules of procedure,222 and
the behavior of its judges 223 and lawyers 22 4-facilitates settlement by
218. Ulen, supra note 78, at 1031 n.22.
219. See supra text accompanying notes 74-79.
220. Russell Korobkin and I have argued elsewhere, for instance, that one factor that may
account for the apparent accuracy of the Economic Theory's predictions is the participation of
lawyers in the litigation process. Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychology, Economics, and
Settlement: A New Look at the Role of the Lawyer, 76 TEX. L. REV. 77, 81 (1997) (seeking to
"provide experimental evidence supportive of the hypothesis that lawyers as a class share an
analytical orientation to decisionmaking that can facilitate a higher rate of settlement than be-
havioral scientists would expect litigants to negotiate on their own").
221. See supra text accompanying note 150.
222. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68, for example, is designed "to significantly increase
the incentives for settlement by attaching financial penalties (through a cost-shifting mechanism)
to the rejection of a settlement offer that was eventually proved (by the verdict) to have been
reasonable." Lesley S. Bonney et al., Rule 68: Awakening a Sleeping Giant, 65 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 379, 380 (1997). If a plaintiff rejects an offer and then fails to recover more at trial, the
plaintiff cannot recover his own costs and must pay the defendant's post-offer costs as well. See
id. Thus, Rule 68 provides additional incentive for the plaintiff to settle by increasing the amount
of regret the plaintiff is likely to feel if he rejects an offer and then recovers less at trial. See, e.g.,
Maj. Terry L. Elling & Maj. Scott L. Kilgore, Contesting Applications for Attorneys' Fees and
Costs in Government Contract Litigation, ARMY LAW., July 1994, at 21, 21 ("A contractor that
declines a settlement offer or offer of judgment eventually may regret that decision. If the con-
tractor prevails on a dollar amount less than or substantially equal to the rejected settlement
offer, it may lose its claim for fees and costs incurred after the date of the offer.").
There is a healthy body of literature on Rule 68, much of which is devoted to economic
analysis of the rule. See, e.g., David A. Anderson, Improving Settlement Devices: Rule 68 and
Beyond, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 261 (1996); David A. Anderson & Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Empirical
Evidence on Settlement Devices: Does Rule 68 Encourage Settlement?, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 519
(1995); Tai-Yeong Chung, Settlement of Litigation Under Rule 68: An Economic Analysis, 25 J.
LEGAL STUD. 261 (1996); Geoffrey P. Miller, An Economic Analysis of Rule 68, 15 J. LEGAL
STUD. 93 (1986).
223. Judges work with litigants to promote settlement in a significant percentage of cases.
See generally FED. R. Civ. P. 16 (providing for judicial settlement conferences); Galanter &
Cahill, supra note 217, at 1342-43. Judges use a variety of techniques to promote settlement. See,
e.g., WAYNE D. BRAZIL, EFFECTIVE APPROACHES TO SETTLEMENT: A HANDBOOK FOR LAW-
YERS AND JUDGES (1988); D. MARIE PROVINE, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CTR., SETTLEMENT STRATE-
GIES FOR FEDERAL DISTRICT JUDGES (1986); Stephen McG. Bundy, The Policy of Settlement in
an Adversary System, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 60-73 (1992). Among other techniques, judges use
regret aversion-intentionally or unintentionally, wittingly or unwittingly, explicitly or implic-
itly-to facilitate settlement by gently or not-so-gently encouraging litigants to consider the emo-
tional as well as financial consequences associated with rejecting a settlement offer in favor of
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capitalizing on litigants' regret aversion. The Regret Aversion Theory,
in short, posits that the civil justice system facilitates a high rate of
settlement not only by offering financial incentives to settle, but by
offering emotional or psychological incentives as well.
trial. See, e.g., PETER H. SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL: MASS Toxic DISASTERS IN THE
COURTS 155-64 (1986) (describing Judge Weinstein's use of regret aversion to encourage both
plaintiffs and defendants to settle at the 11th hour in the Agent Orange litigation).
224. See supra text accompanying note 216.
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